HIGHLIGHTS

• Insecurity has forced more than 530,000 people to flee their homes since the conflict erupted in late 2016. Continuous armed clashes, civilian casualties and the burning of houses, hospitals and other infrastructures continue to cause further displacements.
• The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate as incidents of violent conflict, abductions and widespread violations of international humanitarian law are becoming increasingly prevalent.
• WFP, INGOs and local NGOs distributed food items to 112,962 beneficiaries comprising of IDPs and members of host communities in both regions. In the North West (NW) 32,571 persons were assisted while 80,391 were assisted from the South West (SW).
• As of the end of June, WHO supported community-based surveillance activities in the SW have ended due to lack of funding. There are no surveillance activities taking place in the NW. The risk of an outbreak of preventable diseases in the NWSW is high.
• 841 protection incidents were identified and recorded in June only, an increase of 31.2%, compared to the previous month.
• 1,630 children had access to psychosocial support in Child FriendlySpaces.
• 92 new gender-based violence (GBV) cases were reported by GBV Sub-Cluster partners.
• 30,420 individuals were supported directly with WASH activities.

SITUATION OVERVIEW

Humanitarian

The humanitarian situation in the NWSW regions of the country continues to deteriorate. At least 1.3 million people are in need of assistance and over 530,000 people are internally displaced. Access to people in need is becoming increasingly difficult for the humanitarian community due to rising insecurity. Access constraints hamper humanitarian assessments and prevent assistance reaching those most vulnerable. The conflict is characterized by violations of international humanitarian law with civilians, particularly women and children most vulnerable. Funding for the humanitarian response from the international community falls very short of meeting the increasing needs.

Political

The situation in the NWSW continues to be very tense. International and national actors have continued to mount pressure on both parties for a ceasefire and to initiate a negotiated peace process.

This month, the NWSW Women’s Task Force announced a Black Wednesday Campaign against continuous violence in the two regions. Women dress in black on the first and last Wednesdays of each month, committed to do so until the ongoing crisis is resolved. The National Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Front (SDF – leading opposition party in NWSW)) made a statement on 10 June noting that violence has escalated in the two regions after the visit of the Prime Minister. On 18 June, the conveners of the Anglophone General Conference (AGC) met in Douala. They clarified that the AGC is not a mediating body, but a platform aimed at providing a conducive and impartial forum for people in the grassroots to gather proposals for solutions and submit to the Head of State, who is the guarantor of the sovereignty of the state. The conveners gave no date for the event.

International advocacy has sparked hopes of humanitarian visibility and possible dialogue. On 5 June the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) named the NWSW crisis in Cameroon as the world’s most neglected displacement crisis. In addition, a group of US Senators introduced a bill aimed at suspending US military assistance to Cameroon until Cameroonian military and security forces improve respect for international human rights standards. On 27 June the Swiss Government announced that the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) in partnership with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue has offered his good-office to act as a facilitator in the crisis in the NWSW. A meeting with several independentist groups took place in Switzerland ahead of 27 June 2019 to prepare for dialogue between the groups and the Cameroonian Government. While some independists reject the initiative, others have made public their consent to engage in the talks. The UN and EU have expressed their support for this initiative.

On 6 June, the Minister-delegate in charge of defence visited Bamenda (NW). He met with regional authorities and military commanders. This month, the Government created a Humanitarian Coordination Centre, with two offices in Bamenda (NW) and Buea (SW). Placed under the department of Civil Protection of the Ministry of Territorial Administration, the Centre’s mission is to implement Government humanitarian assistance and coordinate humanitarian activities in the NWSW. On 14 June, the Governor of the NW region lifted the curfew placed in the region since November 2018. The curfew which had lasted eight months restricted movement of persons and property in the NW region from 9pm to 6am. It was a temporal measure by the Governor to curb the heightened insecurity. The Governor also partially lifted the ban on the use motorbikes in some subdivisions of the NW. On 17 June, the President of Cameroon extended the mandates of Members of Parliament (MPs) and Municipal Councillors (including Mayors) to 29 February 2020, postponing local and legislative elections. Legal proceedings continued against people linked to the crisis. On 13 June, a court in the UK sentenced to two years imprisonment a man accused of posting messages that called for violence in Cameroon and bombing of Cameroon’s High Commission. On 19 June, the court case against Ayuk Tabe and Co held in Yaoundé took place and was adjourned to 9 July. The day was met with a ghost town. Ghost towns continued every Monday in both regions.

Security

Violence remained high in June with communal confrontations, targeted killings and harassments. Abductions also continued. There were confrontations between communities, and between parties to the conflict. From 8 to 10 June fighting between the military and opposition armed groups in Esu – Wum (NW) led to several civilian deaths and dozens of houses burnt. One soldier was reported dead and a health center destroyed. Non-State armed groups (NSAGs) have accused a particular community of siding with the military in this incident. The Governor of the NW released a press statement on 4 June condemning the events.

Kidnapping rates increased again in June. On 7 June, gunmen kidnapped the owner of a travel agency in Bamenda (NW) before releasing him hours later. In mid-June gunmen abducted three students of a Teachers Training College in Bambili (NW) and the proprietor of a high school in Limbe (SW). Following the construction of some bridges in Wum (NW), gunmen kidnapped dozens of people who embarked on the road on 18 June. They were freed days after. On 23 June, gunmen abducted the Mayor of Ndu (NW) before releasing him the next day. On 25 June, an armed group reportedly abducted the Archbishop of Bamenda in Belo (NW) before releasing him the next day. On 28 June, armed men abducted the chairperson of the Social Democratic Front (SDF), the leading party in the predominantly Anglophone regions, in Bamenda (NW). He was released on 29 June. The chairperson, Ni John Fru Ndi, is very vocal about the crisis. This is not the first time he is a victim of abduction.

Harassment and torture were also recurrent this month. A video circulated on social media, showing the military harassing a group of men (reportedly from Kurt – Nwa, NW). These men were reportedly found dead after the incident. On 13 June, armed men cut off the leg of a teacher in Mungo village (SW). The teacher survived but was in critical condition. This tragic event illustrates the growing attacks against education activities and personnel. On 21 June, the military reportedly took away a patient that an NGO had evacuated into a Baptist hospital in Mutengene (SW). The patient was reportedly later found dead in Tiko (SW).

Parties to the conflict continued targeting and killing both their opponents and civilians. Fighting between NSAGs and security forces on 5 June reportedly led to the death of three people in Ndekwai (SW) and three in Babungo (NW). On June 12 and 13, fighting between NSAGs and the military led to the death of one member of a NSAG and a civilian in Santa (NW). On 12 June clashes between the military and NSAG in Jakiri (NW) led to several deaths. A local market and houses were burnt during the confrontation. Several villagers fled to the bushes for safety. On 14 June six people were found dead in Babanki village (NW) with no clear indication of who killed them. On 15 June, four Government forces were allegedly killed, and others wounded after their vehicle was blown by an explosive in Otu (SW). In a statement released the same day, the Minister of Communication accused opposition armed groups of conducting the attack with Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). Although this is the first time the Government is admitting to such a loss in the region resulting from IEDs, it is not the first-time separatist fighters have announced that they are using IEDs. Continuous use of IEDs will worsen conflict dynamics. On 27 June, the military reportedly shot at least four people in Sabga (NW). On 17 June NSAGs declared that humanitarian assistance sent from Yaoundé by the Government was allegedly poisoned and that such governmental convoys should be attacked. On 23 June, allegedly NSAGs burnt down trucks carrying WFP supplies in Pinyin (NW).
However, the humanitarian convoy was not marked with UN or partner logo.

Culled from reliefweb.int

Ambazonia leader Sisiku Ayuk Tabe has censured the harsh and inhumane conditions of Southern Cameroons detainees in various French Cameroun detention centers. The leader also informed the AU, EU and the United Nations of a hunger strike action by him and his top aides held at the Kondengui High Security prison.

Speaking to our Yaoundé city reporter after we received a copy of a letter addressed to the international community, the Ambazonia head of state revealed that he wrote to many international organizations appealing to them to put pressure on the French Cameroun regime to immediately end the rights abuses of Southern Cameroons political prisoners.

Some pro Yaoundé Southern Cameroonians operating in Ambazonia have maintained a kind of silence of the lamb ever since the prison riots in Buea and Yaoundé. But are simply pushing on a French Cameroun agenda known as “Back To School”.

The Southern Cameroons Vice President Dabney Yerima urged European authorities in a statement on Monday to investigate allegations of torture, killings and other abuses against prisoners at the Kondengui prisons, located in the capital, Yaoundé, where the Ambazonian leader Sisiku Ayuk Tabe and members of his cabinet including an estimated 300 Southern Cameroons detainees have been on hunger strike.

The Kondengui detention facility has been holding a total of about 3,000 political detainees from the Federal Republic of Ambazonia-Southern Cameroons following Yaoundé’s sweeping crackdown on British Southern Cameroonians since 2017.

The Southern Cameroons detainees at the Kondengui and Buea prisons, while being subjected to a range of physical and verbal abuses, are deprived of their basic rights such as family visits, medical care, and legal consultation.

A lawyer representing the Southern Cameroons detained leadership told the BBC recently that the Southern Cameroons prisoners were being held in overcrowded cells infested with mosquitoes, flies, and other insects, with temperatures of more than 40 degrees Celsius and without any fans or appropriate ventilation.

By Chi Prudence Asong

Over the past two years, the crisis in Cameroon’s Anglophone regions has worsened dramatically, resulting in an increasing number of atrocities committed against civilians which have claimed the lives of close to 2,000 people. In recent months, the international community has finally taken some initial steps to address the situation.

In late June, reports emerged of Switzerland launching an initiative to mediate between the regime and Anglophone separatists in Geneva. This came on the heels of a US-sponsored informal United Nations Security Council meeting, the first of its kind focused on the crisis, where council members again pressed for unconditional dialogue between the two sides.

While these first steps are indeed welcome, it would take a lot more than informal meetings and calls for dialogue to ensure peace and stability return to Cameroon. This is not only because the current political leadership has been particularly intransigent about decentralisation and giving autonomy to the Anglophone community, but also because the Anglophone crisis has deep colonial roots and is intertwined with other ethnic and religious fault lines in Cameroonian society which are also raising internal tensions.

The escalating Anglophone conflict

Like many other conflicts across Africa, the one in Cameroon has deep roots in the colonial history of the country. Up until the 19th century, its territory was divided between various local kingdoms and fiefdoms. In the 1880s, the Germans launched a campaign of colonisation of the area and established Cameroon as their colony in 1884.

After World War I, the League of Nations handed control over the territory to Britain and France which divided it and established separate administrative systems. As anti-colonial sentiments swept through Africa following World War II, the French and British Cameroons separately sought their independence.

However, the British convinced the UN that Anglophone Cameroon was not economically viable and could only survive by uniting with Francophone Cameroon or Nigeria. While the northern part of Anglophone Cameroon voted to join Nigeria, neither option was as popular in the southern part which, in the absence of a much preferred option for separate statehood, ultimately joined with French Cameroon.

When the two territories reunited in 1961, a new constitution was drafted to define the new union as a federal entity in which the autonomy of the English-speaking minority would be protected. However, in 1972, a controversial referendum transformed the federation into a unitary state, effectively ending the autonomy of the Anglophone regions.

The fact that the will of the Anglophone population was overruled in 1961 and the subsequent systemic discrimination and marginalisation they suffered under successive governments dominated by Francophones planted the seeds of the current separatist conflict.

Under the present constitution, Cameroon is a decentralised unitary state. In reality, however, it is one of the most hyper-centralised states in Francophone Africa. For example, while all councils in the country are supposed to be governed by locally elected mayors and councillors, the executive often appoints “super mayors” who answer directly to the president, causing resentment and friction between the elected officials who represent the people and the unelected ones who represent the central government.

Calls to address the separatist conflict through broad-based reforms, including reinstatement of the federal system – which Fancophones, unlike before, are beginning to subscribe to – have been met with repression. The government has made it clear that the unitary character of the state is non-negotiable.

This, in turn, has fed separatist sentiments among the Anglophone population and resulted in the present conflict, which is threatening the territorial integrity of the country.

Ethno-regional fault lines

Though overshadowed by the separatist conflict, tensions rooted in ethnicity and religion also pose a significant threat to the state. 

Ethnicity, in particular, has recently re-emerged, in the wake of the 2018 presidential election, as another deepening fault line. The ethnic tensions in Cameroon revolve around two groups that both have competing claims to power – the Bamilekes and the Bulu-Betis.

The first group occupies the western grasslands of Cameroon, and has strong cultural ties to one of the Anglophone regions, despite their Francophone colonial heritage. They control the economy, and most of the country’s manufacturing sector. This economic clout has increased their appetite for political power.

The second group, the Bulu-Betis, occupies the central and the southern regions where President Paul Biya hails from. They have dominated political power since 1981 when Cameroon’s first president, Amadou Ahidjo, handpicked Biya as his successor. Bulus and Betis see themselves as the natural rulers of Cameroon.

In the run-up to the 2018 election, both groups engaged in inflammatory rhetoric, with the most virulent and xenophobic attacks coming from journalists working for the Bulu-owned and dominated Vision4 Television.

In the wake of the disputed elections, this ethnic tension escalated into violent attacks by anti-government protesters of Cameroonian origin on Cameroonian embassies in Berlin, Paris and other Western capitals earlier this year. Eventually, Cameroon’s main opposition leader Maurice Kamto – a Bamileke – who is widely believed to have won the polls, was arrested and charged with sedition, insurrection and inciting violence. He remains imprisoned to this day amid escalating tensions.

Historically, Anglophones, not the Bamilekes, have been the targets of such intimidation and bigotry in Cameroon. For example, in 1992, when John Fru Ndi, an Anglophone, beat Biya in the presidential election, he was cheated out of his victory just like Kamto and placed under house arrest for three months. Biya then imposed a state of emergency on the English-speaking northwest region, increasing the resentment of Anglophone Cameroonians and solidifying the foundations of the ongoing separatist conflict. 

In 2017, journalists from Vision4 Television, who lead the racist attacks on Bamilekes throughout the election season, also targeted Anglophones, openly calling for their elimination.

One might imagine these shared experiences of the two groups at the hands of the Bulu-Betis, and their cultural similarities would provide the impetus for an Anglo-Bamileke alliance as a powerful political force that could upend the status quo. However, four decades of British and French rule over the respective groups had left its mark. The mindset and political philosophies of each group developed along fundamentally different trajectories. These differences overshadow any other commonalities they may have that could allow such strategic and political cooperation between the two groups.

Religious divisions

Another claim to political power comes from the north, the region Cameroon’s former President Amadou Ahidjo hailed from. Even though they are not vocal about it, northerners, who are predominantly Muslim (and also Francophone) widely believe that political power in Cameroon should alternate between the Christian south (Anglophones included) and the Muslim north, also known as the Septentrion.

About a decade ago, Amadou Ali, a Muslim northerner and justice and vice prime minister at that time, revealed as much. A 2009 US embassy cable leaked in 2011 quotes him as saying that while the north would support Biya for as long as he wants to be in power, they would not accept another southerner – much less another Beti-Bulu – to succeed him. According to the cable, Ali also said that even if the Beti-Bulus were to try to assert themselves in a post-Biya scenario, they would be too few to take on the northerners. In his view, the foundation of Cameroon’s stability rests on the detente between the north – which is culturally distinct from the rest of the country – and the predominantly Christian south.

In this context, it is important to recall, that Cameroon’s first-ever coup d’etat launched on April 6, 1984, was largely an initiative of elite soldiers from the Muslim north who were unable to come to terms with the transfer of power to a southern Christian two years earlier. After almost four decades of Christian dominance, they naturally feel the political succession question, whenever it is finally addressed, must be resolved in their favour.

Anglophones made similar claims in the past – that decades of uninterrupted Francophone majority rule (including the tenure of Muslim-Francophone Ahidjo) should logically be followed by a representative of the Anglophone minority taking over the presidency and setting up a mechanism to alternate power between the two groups in the future.

Indeed, Cameroon’s fault lines are complex and have deep roots in the country’s colonial past, but they are not impossible to overcome. Biya’s 37-year rule and his increasing authoritarianism have exacerbated all these crises. If he does not reconsider and start an open dialogue with all aggrieved groups, he risks dragging the whole country into a deadly civil conflict.

Culled from Aljazeera

Cameroon Concord News Group sources believe that the French Cameroun army is planning to carry out an assault on the Eyumojock sub constituency in the Manyu County in response to the attack by Ambazonia Restoration Forces on a Cameroon military convoy, which it blamed the Southern Cameroons Interim Government.

Our chief intelligence officer in Mamfe said the Cameroon government army is now stationed in Otu and assessing plans to carry out the assault on Southern Cameroons Self Defense Forces in the Ekok area.

We understand the Manyu Advisory Council has been holding non-stop discussions involving senior Manyu Warriors commanders and advisers to counter the French Cameroun attack. The Cameroon army plan would be for soldiers loyal to the regime in Yaoundé to launch an attack on an Ambazonian camp in Otu.

The Francophone troops invaded Nkongho village and killed 10 Southern Cameroons civilians according to the Ambazonian Vice President Dabney Yerima.

This item is still developing

By Rita Akana