Paul Biya received Nigerian business tycoon Aliko Dangote at the Unity Palace on Wednesday 23 June. State media reported that for over an hour, the two men reviewed the functioning of the landmark cement factory operated by Dangote in Cameroon.

Aliko Dangote expressed his deep admiration and gratitude to the Francophone dictator who he said has always stood by him and spared no effort to facilitate the implantation of his business in Cameroon. He pointed out that President Paul BIYA always gave him hope and was very supportive of his business investments in Cameroon.

Aliko Dangote also revealed that his company intends to set up in other locations in Cameroon so as to increase the output of his cement factory. He noted that further investments will be made in other domains, including oil and gas and that he felt very much at home here, because Cameroon is a very good neighbour to Nigeria.

The audience was crowned with a medal award as President Paul BIYA raised Aliko Dangote with the Commander of the National Order of Valour. He was very elated with the great honour accorded to him by the Head of State, as sign of recognition given to a true friend.

Reported by PRC with additional editing from Camcordnews

The Biya Francophone Beti Ewondo regime recently revealed that $333 million of the money borrowed from China will go to the Israeli-trained Bridgade d’Intervention Rapide (BIR) known for its ruthlessness, inhumanity, and rank brutality in Southern Cameroons.

Cameroon Concord News understands that all the huge loans contracted from China have been channeled to three projects: seaport, electricity dam, and pipe water from Sanaga to Yaoundé) in French Cameroun which are all in Beti-Ewondo areas.

Our senior political man pointed out that the project allocation scheme strengthens the now public knowledge that the Betis are actively continuing to lay down the infrastructural foundation for their eventual Fang Republic secession. “One can see why they are so eager to keep President Paul Biya in power, even as a corpse. They need him there so that they complete all these projects” he added.

We of the Concord Group have taken interest in this Sino-Biya Affair because this massive loan has to be repaid. This begs the question but from which resources? The answer is simple: It can only be from resources of various kinds from Southern Cameroons-Ambazonia. Correspondingly, this also explains the reason for the war against the people of Southern Cameroons and why Biya and his French Cameroun political elites are not interested in any end to the war and negotiations.

The political and economic engineering of the Fang Republic has been designed to stifle both the Douala seaport and the Douala airport. Once the Kribi seaport is completed, ships will be diverted to Kribi and so too the Customs headquarters in Douala. Already, they are staging televised debate making the case that the Douala seaport is silting and does not allow big ships. The Douala seaport will gradually become redundant and die off. The Bamilekes will now import and export products from Kribi which of course will be more expensive for them and the business community in French Cameroun.

In the same way, Nsimalen will be decreed the main international airport. Flights to and from Douala will gradually reduce and eventually peter out. The airport is going to be allowed to fall into a state of disrepair, declared unsafe for international aviation, and abandoned to rot, and allowed only for occasional use by the military.  The Bamis, the Sawas and Bassas are not seeing these entire Beti-Ewondo diabolic harsh ploy and they are still maintaining a kind of silence of the lamb instead of engaging in necessary counter activism.

About half of the population in Douala, the chief city in the Littoral region in French speaking Cameroun is threatened with famine; inflation is at 300% and Cameroon as a nation is effectively bankrupt.

By Soter Tarh Agbaw-Ebai

The Technical Commission for the Rehabilitation of Public and Para-public Enterprises (CTR) is seeking a consultant to audit state-owned operator Camtel, Business In Cameroon reported.

 CTR president Martial Valery Zang has invited expressions of interest by 12 July. The project cost is XOF 400 million and would be funded by the state budget.

Source: Telecompaper

In April 2021, the Cameroonian government announced that it was in talks with Rothschild and Co. to obtain advice on a Eurobond sale that would be used to repay a portion of the $750 million in debt that it sold in 2015. The announcement that Cameroon would again need to enter the Eurobond market to obtain credit came after the International Monetary Fund (IMF) classified the central African country as at high risk of debt distress, both to internal and external lenders. The classification of Cameroon as facing a high risk of debt distress was made in January 2020, before the economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has undoubtedly worsened the fiscal and monetary standing of the country. The credit situation in Cameroon may further deteriorate as an IMF extended credit facility (ECF) that has provided the country with monetary assistance is due to expire in summer 2021. While the IMF and Cameroon have engaged in talks about renewing the ECF it is unclear if that will occur, particularly in light of recent news that a $335 million loan issued by the IMF to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic had been misappropriated.

Cameroon finding itself at risk of debt distress is not a new occurrence and is a result of the country’s borrowing habits over several decades. In 2007, public debt was only 12 percent of Cameroon’s gross domestic product (GDP), and by September of 2020 the figure had increased to over 45 percent of the country’s GDP.  While much of the recent attention has focused on Cameroon’s Eurobond holdings and multilateral debt, over two-thirds of the country’s debt is external. Out of Cameroon’s external debt, 61 percent is owed to China, making Beijing the country’s largest creditor. Therefore, to understand Cameroon’s risk of debt distress and the continuous credit problems that the country is facing, it is imperative to examine its debts to China.

Types of Debts Issued by China to Cameroon

China has issued over $6.2 billion in loans to Cameroon, the majority of which broadly concern infrastructure and energy. The majority of these loans are for major projects that are at least partially funded by the Cameroonian government. In many cases, the Export-Import Bank of China will fund most of an initiative through a loan and the Cameroonian government will be responsible for paying upfront around 15 percent of a project. The financing that the government of Cameroon is required to provide for the projects has at times slowed the disbursement of Chinese loans, which partially explains why 28 percent of all undispersed external debt in Cameroon is held by China. Notably, the majority of Chinese loans to Cameroon finance large and highly visible projects that are implemented by Chinese firms.

The largest source of Cameroon’s debt to China is the ongoing construction of a deep-water port in the town of Kribi in the southern region of the country. The agreement between the Export-Import Bank of China and the government of Cameroon to finance the port’s construction was first signed in 2011 and saw a concessionary loan of nearly $400 million granted. This was furthered in 2017 when the Export-Import Bank of China issued a $680 million loan for the second phase of the port’s construction. $150 million of the loan was concessional, whereas the rest was a preferential buyer credit agreement. Eighty-five percent of the financing of the port is provided by China, while the remainder is from the Cameroonian government. The state-run China Harbor Engineering Corporation (CHEC) is overseeing the construction of the port.

It is widely agreed that the construction of a deep-water port in Kribi is needed. Currently, over 90 percent of Cameroon’s maritime trade goes through the port of Douala, which is filled with sediment and is not deep enough for many ships. Once completed, the port in Kribi will be the largest in Central Africa and will be connected by railways to iron ore mines in the east of Cameroon. However, the project has caused resentment among the local community where the port is being constructed. During the process of construction, the village of Lolabe had to be destroyed, and its 400 residents were displaced. While the Cameroonian government was responsible for the displacement and embezzling funds allocated for compensation, many see the Chinese government as at best complacent in the matter. Locals complain of division between the approximately 300 Chinese workers on the project and Cameroonian laborers. Cameroonian laborers have also complained of mistreatment and abuse by their Chinese supervisors.  The fact that the only two financers of the project are the Export-Import Bank of China and the Cameroonian government has also caused concerns that the port may need to be leased to China if Cameroon were to default on its debt, as occurred in the case of Hambantota in Sri Lanka.

The second largest source of Chinese debt issued to Cameroon is the Yaoundé water supply project from the Sanaga River (PAEPYS) which aims to address water scarcity challenges in the Cameroonian capital and surrounding localities. Once completed, the project will significantly increase the amount of water supplied to the city, and according to the Cameroonian government will end the need for the city’s residents to ration water. Eighty-five percent of the project is financed through a loan worth over $678 million from the Export-Import Bank of China, with the remaining 15 percent being provided by the Cameroonian government. The construction of the project is being overseen by the China National Machinery Industry Corporation, popularly known as Sinomach, a state-owned enterprise. The project was originally slated to be completed in December 2020, although the Cameroonian government has announced that it will be delayed until July of this year due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

While the project has the potential to address the pertinent issue of water shortages in Yaoundé, the financing of the project is solely done by the Cameroonian government and the Export-Import Bank of China, making it unclear what procedures may be in place should Cameroon not be able to repay the $678 million it will owe to China after the project is completed. However, the Cameroonian government has rejected the notion that the project is an instance of so-called “debt trap diplomacy.”

The third largest source of Cameroon’s debt to China is the Memve’ele hydropower dam project located on the Ntem river in the south region of the country. Once completed, the dam will have the potential to generate 211MW of hydroelectric power, which the Cameroonian government hopes can address the electricity deficit in the country where approximately 62 percent of the population do not have reliable access to electricity. The project is financed by a $541 million loan from the Export-Import Bank of China, in addition to $190 million from the African Development Bank (ADB), and $110 million from the Cameroonian government. This differs greatly from the two aforementioned projects, which are solely financed by China and Cameroon without a third party.

The project was originally being implemented by a British firm, but in 2009 the Chinese state-owned hydropower company Sinohydro took over the project. Construction of the dam began in 2013 and was supposed to be completed by 2017, although the project has experienced many delays. As of December 2020, the Cameroonian government claimed that the construction of a transmission line would be completed by March of this year and that commercial commissioning for the power plant would begin in September. The Memve’ele dam has been listed by the World Bank as a project that costs six to eight times more than similar initiatives in countries with comparable levels of development to Cameroon, leading to concerns of corruption and overpaying those assisting in implementation. There has also been opposition to the project from local communities who have been removed from their land to allow for construction. This is the case in Nyabizang, where the dam is being built, in addition to communities where transmission lines are being built to transmit hydropower to the Cameroonian capital of Yaoundé.

While the Kribi deep water port, the Sanga River water supply project, and the Memve’ele hydropower dam constitute a large percentage of Cameroon’s debt to China, the projects are by no means the totality of it. In total, Cameroon owes China at least $5.2 billion that was issued through at least 45 loans. Projects related to transport, energy, technology, and water all occupy at least a $1 billion of debt. Notably, at least $333 million of the loans are related to the Cameroonian military, which has played a key role in human rights violations in conflicts across the country.

Risk of Default and Debt Relief

The potential of Cameroon not being able to repay its debts to China became evident when Yaoundé was not able to fulfill some terms of its debt, which resulted in tougher financial conditions that began in 2017. In 2018, on the sidelines of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held in Beijing, the Cameroonian government formally requested that its debt to China be restructured. The severity of the situation and the real probability that Cameroon may not be able to repay its debts was underscored in January 2019 when Cameroon unilaterally withheld debt service payments to China, to which the  Export-Import Bank of China responded by freezing payments for projects in Cameroon.

In July 2019, Cameroon and China reached an agreement to restructure the payment of debts during the visit of Yang Jiechi, the director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, to Yaoundé. The restricting of the debt saw a total of $250 million of payments deferred over the following three years, although Cameroon would still be required to pay back the total amount of each loan by its original due date. In short, the relief would only be temporary, and Cameroon would still have to repay the total amount that it owed to the Export-Import Bank of China. A total of $78 million of Cameroon’s debt to China was canceled, although the debt was composed of payments that were supposed to be made to China the previous year but were not. This followed previous cancellations of Cameroon’s debt to China in 2001, 2007, and 2010.

However, it is important to note that the quantity of Cameroon’s debt to China that has been forgiven pales when compared to that of other countries. For instance, in 2006 France cancelled $195 million of Cameroonian debt, and issued further $474 million of debt relief in 2011. Canada forgave $227 million of debt owed to Ottawa by Yaoundé in 2006. In short, while the debt restructuring agreed to in 2019 provided temporary relief to the Cameroonian government, it did not tangibly change the difficulties that Yaoundé would face in paying its debts to Beijing.

In May 2020, Cameroon again delayed its debt payments to China through the debt service suspension initiative (DSSI) agreed to by members of the G-20, which includes China. This greatly benefitted Cameroon, as over half of its bilateral debts are to China. Specifically, in 2020 China deferred a payment from Cameroon worth over $55 million, and in 2021 Beijing deferred a further payment worth nearly $20 million. These payments will now be served between 2022 and 2025, in addition to the payments that were already scheduled for those years. This likely means that Cameroon will face increased difficulties paying its debts into the mid-2020s, due to both the delayed payments to China in addition to the delayed payments that Yaoundé will eventually need to make to Paris Club creditors.

Despite the temporary rescheduling of debt payments, China continues to remain the top source of Cameroon’s debt. The difficulties that Cameroon will face regarding its debts to China will only increase going into the mid-2020s when large sums of debt are due to be serviced. This situation regarding Cameroon’s debt to China in addition to other creditors raises serious questions about the Central African country’s ability to service its debts. This is not only due to the quantity of the debt, but the continued poor economic figures in the country as a result of political instability and the COVID-19 pandemic. What might happen if Cameroon reaches a point where it is not able to service its debts? The possibilities include, but are not limited to, defaulting on its debt, as occurred in Zambia in 2020, or potentially ceding temporary ownership of facilities funded by external creditors. 

Culled from The Diplomat.com

Nexttel Cameroon has announced plans to introduce its mobile money services in the country by December, Nextvame reported. Nexttel Possa, which means Nexttel wallet, will be launched in collaboration with UBA Cameroon in compliance with CEMAC regulations. Their collaboration for that purpose was authorised by the central bank of the CEMAC region, Bank of Central African States (BEAC) on 12 March 2018.

Source: Telecompaper

The atrocities being committed by Cameroon government army soldiers including pro Biya armed militias is heralding the complete and total  collapse of Southern Cameroons finances, and the war is placing a health burden on the English speaking population.

Suffering is deepening in all the 13 administrative units in Southern Cameroons particularly in Ekondo Titi-a locality in Ndian Division where Cameroon government troops recently destroyed nearly all local palm oil production facilities run by the inhabitants of the area.

A leading figure for peace in Southern Cameroons, Judith Nwana has been quoted as saying that the economy of the people of Ekondo Titi district is now in shambles amid rising poverty levels and increasing military operations by the regime in Yaoundé.

Ever since the war started in 2017, the economy in English speaking Cameroon has stagnated and per capita income has gotten a humpty dumpty fall leading to an increase in unemployment and deepening poverty.

The long term economic prospects for the people of Ekondo Titi and the entire Southern Cameroons-Ambazonia are even grimmer and there are no signs that these negative trends will be reversed soon following the unnecessary divisions among the Ambazonian groups and France’s ever increasing support for the 88-year-old President Biya.

The reasons behind the total collapse of the Southern Cameroons economy are the continues fighting between Cameroon government soldiers and the Ambazonia Restoration Forces, suffocation of Southern Cameroons business community by Francophone taxation officers, complete neglect of the territory by the Biya Francophone regime, deterioration of the security situation particularly in the rural areas and lack of an internationally backed peace initiative.

The Vice President of the Southern Cameroons Interim Government, Dabney Yerima told a news conference recently that all sectors of the Southern Cameroons economy are constrained by the French Cameroun imposed war and that what happened in Ekondo Titi was simply a repeat of Kwa Kwa, Muyenge, Ngarbuh, Ndu and Weh.

By Soter Tarh Agbaw-Ebai

Cameroon’s government has received the go-ahead to issue loans on the international market worth 450 billion CFA francs ($845 million) this year, according to an order signed by President Paul Biya on Wednesday.

It said this would be done mainly for the partial or full redemption of the current Eurobond. Cameroon issued that 10-year Eurobond worth $750 million in 2015.

Source: Reuters

Even before the Friday incident at the Nsimalen International airport when a plane belonging to Cameroon’s national carrier, CAMAIR-CO ran off the runway, causing panic among passengers and flight crew, analysts had warned that CPDM corruption and poor leadership was making it difficult for the Biya regime to improve Cameroon’s air safety.

The exact circumstances of the incident are not yet known but first unofficial report hinted of no casualties.

Nsimalen airport officials say they have successfully evacuated all the passengers onboard the plane from the scene and only a scientific investigation will reveal the cause of the problem.

Despite CamairCo assurances to its customers, controversy still rages over the cause of the Nsimalen incident.

According to Cameroon Intelligence Report, which quoted an anonymous official in the Ministry of Transport, Camair Co has been flying coffins for over a decade.

The regime in Yaoundé has reportedly denied that the plane was faulty. But many in the Aviation industry contacted by Cameroon Concord News said that there were issues with the engine.

Some months ago, seven Cameroon government ministers had to make an emergency trip to the North of the country using a Kenya airways plane.

No one in the Ministry of Transport can provide any information on the various departments responsible for control of the systems, in terms of certification and control of CamairCo activities.

The general manager of CamairCo and his entire staff including the board of directors are all chartered members of the ruling CPDM Crime Syndicate. Correspondingly, the company avoids complying with government regulations by paying off officials.

If the CamairCo plane that ran off the runway on Friday was faulty, then it is evidently clear that the company paid an inspector to allow the aircraft to fly.

Air travel within Cameroon and all of Africa remains relatively dangerous. In 2010, The International Civil Aviation Organization reported that the accident rate for air traffic in Africa was more than four times the global average.

By Soter Tarh Agbaw-Ebai with files

Cameroon’s public finances have proven relatively resilient to the pandemic shock and we expect the deficit to be on a downward path over the medium term. The fiscal deficit on a cash basis widened in 2020 to 4.5% of GDP from 3.0% in 2019, owing to an only mild hit to tax collection and limited expenditure increases in response to the coronavirus shock (1.3% of GDP), given financing constraints. The phasing-out of pandemic-related spending and a recovery in tax receipts will bring the deficit down to 3.5% of GDP in 2021 and 3.0% in 2022. We assume the government would cut capital expenditure if revenues fell beyond the authorities’ forecast.

Near- and medium-term financing risks have lowered, in our view. We expect Cameroon to meet around 80% of its fiscal financing needs in 2021 (7.4% of GDP) through external project loans and domestic financing. The extension of the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) to 1H21 will provide minor relief of 0.4% of GDP, although this will be higher if the authorities extend it for the whole year. Cameroon is likely to renew its Extended Credit Facility with the IMF before the end of 2Q21, which should catalyse additional official creditor support to fully cover funding needs in 2021 and ease funding conditions over the medium term.

At present, Cameroon is not planning to request a debt treatment under the G20’s Common Framework. It may issue another Eurobond to buy back a part of its 2025 Eurobond (USD750 million; 9.5%), due to be repaid in three instalments over 2023-2025. This would smooth the repayment schedule, although the annual amortisation over the period is small at 0.6% of GDP. We expect Cameroon will be able to roll-over domestic debt coming due in 2021 (2.7% of GDP) and interest payments on the Eurobond in 2021 and 2022, are small at 0.2% of GDP.

Cameroon’s ‘B’ ratings balance low GDP per capita and weak governance indicators against moderate government debt and low inflation supported by membership of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC).

We project general government debt to increase to 44% of GDP in 2022, from 42% of GDP in 2019, well below the current ‘B’ median forecast of 71% of GDP for 2022. Fitch’s debt ratio includes the debt of the public refinery SONARA (3% of GDP in 2020) as the government serviced this in 2020, although there is no explicit state guarantee. There has been some progress in on-going restructuring negotiations over SONARA’s debt, which could lead to an agreement before the end of the year but further delays are possible. Other SOE debt is estimated at 4.2% of GDP in 2020, although this official figure could understate its magnitude.

We expect real GDP growth to rebound to 4.3% in 2021 and 3.7% in 2022, after showing relative resilience to the pandemic shock with a 1.5% contraction in 2020 (‘B’ median of -4.2%). The recovery will be driven by higher demand for Cameroon’s agricultural exports and increased activity in the manufacturing and services sectors, but will remain moderate given persisting financing constraints, credit retrenchments and slow progress on vaccination. A slight decline in oil production in 2022 will adversely affect the growth outlook, although at 5% of GDP the sector is not a key driver. A longer or more severe pandemic shock would hit growth.

External liquidity risks are limited. Fitch forecasts the current account deficit to narrow to 4.4% of GDP in 2021 and 4.1% in 2022 from 5.2% of GDP in 2020, as agricultural and oil exports increase. The bulk of external funding needs will be funded by government borrowing. Access to CEMAC’s pooled stock of international reserves (USD7.4 billion end-January 2021) and to the convertibility guarantee provided by France somewhat mitigates external liquidity and short-term devaluation risks.

ESG – Governance: Cameroon has an ESG Relevance Score of ‘5’ for both Political Stability and Rights and for the Rule of Law, Institutional and Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption, as is the case for all sovereigns. These scores reflect the high weight that World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) has in our proprietary Sovereign Rating Model. Cameroon has a low WBGI ranking at the 14th percentile, reflecting institutional weakness, political instability as well as on-going security issues in the Anglophone regions and the far-North, for which we do not expect a near-term resolution. Deeply entrenched political divisions could also compound the risk of a disorderly transition of power from the 88-year-old president, Paul Biya.

Culled from Fitchratings

Today (9 March 2021) the United Kingdom has signed an Economic Partnership Agreement with Cameroon.

The trade deal, which will support jobs and build future prosperity, was signed by International Trade Minister Ranil Jayawardena and High Commissioner of Cameroon to the UK, H.E. Albert Fotabong Njoteh in London. The deal provides certainty for British and Cameroonian businesses, ensuring they can continue to trade as freely as they do now without any additional barriers or tariffs.

The UK-Cameroon trade was worth around £200m in 2019, and this deal lays a foundation to extend our trading relationship in the future. The UK market accounts for 12% of total exports of bananas from Cameroon and this agreement will maintain tariff-free market access to the UK. It also guarantees continued market access for UK exporters, who sold £50m in goods to Cameroon in 2019.

International Trade Minister Ranil Jayawardena said:

Today’s deal secures opportunities for both British and Cameroonian businesses – and will help support jobs and foster investment.

International trade and investment are engines of economic growth around the globe, so today’s deal will play a crucial role as we all build back better from Covid-19.

Minister for Africa James Duddridge said:

This agreement will make sure around £200m of trade between the UK and Cameroon can continue, supporting Cameroonian businesses to increase operations, enabling UK exporters to sell more goods and boosting prosperity for both countries as we together recover from the Covid-19 pandemic.

This provides the continuity businesses in both the UK and Cameroon need to ensure trade between our countries continues to flourish and grow.

Today’s signing comes after the agreement to roll over current EU-Cameroon trading arrangements from 1 January 2021 concluded at the end of December.

The UK government has secured agreements covering 66 countries plus the EU, worth £890bn of trade in 2019.

Source: Gov.UK