Business

23, December 2019

US: Boeing fires CEO Muilenburg as 737 MAX crisis deepens ⁰

US aerospace company Boeing has fired Chief Executive Officer Dennis Muilenburg, following a year of intense scrutiny and industrial setbacks set off by twin fatal crashes of its 737 MAX jetliner.

The management shakeup comes as the world’s largest planemaker struggles to win regulatory approvals for its grounded best-selling jetliner while trying to regain trust with passengers and airline customers.

Boeing’s chairman David Calhoun will take over as CEO and president, effective January 13, the company said Monday, adding that a change in leadership was necessary to restore confidence in the company.

The 737 MAX grounding was the biggest crisis of Muilenburg’s 34-year tenure at Boeing, where he started as an intern in 1985, rising through the company’s defense and services ranks to the top job in 2015.

The company said this month it would stop production of the 737 Max in January after the head of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) said Boeing was pushing for an unrealistically quick return of the grounded jets.

A senior industry source called the wording of Boeing’s statement “brutal”. Another said the decision was inevitable after spiraling pressures from the 737 production halt to a public slap-down from the FAA, topped off by an embarrassing space launch snafu on Friday.

Speculation that Muilenburg would be fired had been circulating in the industry for months, intensifying in October when the board stripped him of his chairman title.

A Boeing official said the board deliberated over the weekend and they made the decision to fire Muilenburg in a phone call on Sunday.

In keeping Muilenburg in the job as long as Boeing has, the company was ignoring elements of the classic crisis communications playbook used by other companies, said Paul Argenti, a professor at Dartmouth’s Tuck School of Business.

“You want to bring somebody from the outside to bring fresh perspective to ‘save the day,’” Argenti said. “He should have been gone a long time ago. He is part of the problem.”

The 737 Max was grounded worldwide after two crashes — one in October 2018 off the cost of Indonesia and another in March 2019 in Ethiopia — which killed a combined total of 346 people.

Investigators say that in both crashes, a faulty sensor caused the plane’s MCAS system to push the nose of the plane down and pilots were unable to regain control.

“This is something that we have been asking and struggling for quite some time,” said Ababu Amha, who lost his wife, a flight attendant, in the second crash involving an Ethiopian Airlines aircraft. “The CEO reluctantly and deliberately kept the aircraft in service after the Lion Air crash. The Ethiopian Airlines crash was a preventable accident.”

The resignation, however, is not enough, Amha said. “They should further be held accountable for their actions because what they did was a crime.”

(Source: Agencies)

19, December 2019

737 MAX production shutdown big blow to Boeing, US economy ⁰

Boeing’s temporary halt in production of its 737 MAX jet lays bare a deepening crisis that could soon weigh even more heavily on the American economy.

The aviation giant’s announcement late Monday put no timeframe on the stoppage. But Wall Street analysts immediately began accounting for a bigger earnings hit — with effects that could extend well into the 2020s as Boeing remains stuck in crisis mode after two deadly crashes.

Analysts said the halt will be a blow to key MAX suppliers, potentially dooming some companies, and will mar US growth through the loss of investment and exports on the macroeconomic ledger.

Boeing’s announcement “creates more questions than answers,” Bank of America analyst Ronald Epstein said in a client note, adding that both the length of the shutdown and its effects on the supply chain were crucial but unanswered questions.

Gregory Daco, chief US economist at Oxford Economics, put the hit to first-quarter growth at about 0.5 percent. Such a drag is “relatively large for one specific company,” Daco told AFP in an interview.

“The US is facing a number of headwinds and the US economy is cooling as we head into 2020,” he said. “So this is a shock.”

Shutdown floated in July

Halting production puts into effect a scenario the company first floated in July as a contingency measure.

A stoppage “is not something we want to do but it is an alternative we have to prepare for as a smart part of our thorough and disciplined process here to make sure we’re covering all scenarios,” Boeing’s Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg said at the time.

Boeing in April cut production on the plane to 42 from 52, weeks after the second of two deadly crashes that together killed 346 people.

Since mentioning the possibility of the halt, Muilenburg and other executives had indicated a strong preference against the idea because of its effect on the Boeing supply chain.

In October, Muilenburg said the company was in close contact with more than 600 US suppliers for the 737 program, many of the them “small and medium-sized businesses that have also been affected by the 737 grounding.”

But Boeing on Monday opted for the temporary shutdown, saying the move was necessary because of a lengthier-than-expected regulatory process and the need to safely deliver some 400 airplanes that have been built and stored since the grounding in March.

“It is our plan that affected employees will continue 737-related work or be temporarily assigned to other teams in Puget Sound,” Boeing said.

The company said it will continue to keep “our customers, employees and supply chain top of mind as we continue to assess appropriate actions.”

The announcement came four days after Boeing conceded that the MAX would not return to the skies before 2020, an acknowledgement that came only after the Federal Aviation Administration publicly criticized Boeing’s return-to-service schedule as unrealistic.

Drag on 2023 earnings?

For Boeing itself, analysts at JPMorgan Chase estimated a potential impact at more than $1 billion per month to maintain staff and supply chain resources throughout the production halt.

But there will be a bigger overall drag to revenues from the pushing out of new plane deliveries, an action that likely also increasing Boeing compensation payments to airlines, analysts said.

On Tuesday, Southwest Airlines again extended its grounding of the MAX due to regulatory uncertainty, this time through April 13, 2020.

The stoppage also almost certainly scotches Boeing’s plan — confirmed as recently as October — to fully restore output on the MAX to 52 per month before raising production to 57 per month by the end of 2020.

Morningstar said such a ramp-up was “unlikely” and that MAX profit margins would be negatively affected by the crisis through 2023.

“We believe the supply chain will be unable to easily increase production to its highest-ever levels after a total shutdown,” Morningstar said in the note.

A key question concerns supply companies, especially if there is a prolonged shutdown. These include Spirit Aerosystems, which builds fuselage systems for the MAX.

“We estimate that the supply chain could begin to lose players after three months of no orders from Boeing,” said Ernest Arvai of Air Insight.

“It may be the case that some smaller suppliers will either need financial assistance from Boeing or face insolvency, which would mean that Boeing would need to find new suppliers on the return to production.”

(Source: AFP)

18, December 2019

Biya, money, morality and State-owned enterprises in French Cameroun ⁰

Ernest Ela Evina holds the record as the longest serving general manager of a public company in French Cameroun. To be sure, Evina was appointed in 1974 by the late President Ahmadou Ahidjo as general manager of the National Center for Studies and Experimentation in Agricultural Machinery (Ceneema). Mr Ernest Ela Evina was only replaced last Friday by the French Cameroun head of state Paul Biya after 45 years as General Manager. No one knows the current bill of health of CENEEMA.

According to the Paul Biya decree signed last Friday, December 06, 2019, Evina got replaced by Mrs. Mebande Bate née Ekotto

A failed State

The French Cameroonian law of July 12, 2017 and certain provisions of laws 2017/10 and 2017/11 relating to the status of public enterprises and public establishments limit the duration of a general manager at the head of the company to 9 years (three terms of 3 years). This had nothing to do with the Biya-Evina relationship.

On June 19, 2019, President Biya signed another decree specifying the terms of application of certain provisions of the laws of 2017, on the general status of public establishments and public enterprises as well as the remuneration, allowances and benefits of their leaders.

Last July, Jean-Pierre Kédi, general manager of the Electricity Sector Regulatory Agency (Arsel) announced his intention to step down after 9 years at the head of the public company to remain in compliance with the law. But his announcement was perceived as a thunderbolt in a country where resignation is not in the habits of barons of the ruling CPDM crime syndicate.

Mindful of the numerous cases of Biya loyalists who have gone far beyond their mandates as general managers, it is evidently clear that French Cameroun is a one man show.

The local French Cameroun press recently cited extensively the cases of many other general managers and Board Chairs who are still in office. They include:

Camille Mouthe Bidias, CEO of the National Employment Fund (FNE) since 1991, 28 years old

Adolphe Moudiki, General Manager of the National Hydrocarbons Company (SNH) since 1993, 26 years

Yao Aissatou, General Manager of the National Investment Company (SNI) since 2003, 16 years

Marie Claire Nnana has been 12 years at the head of the Cameroon Press and Publishing Society (SOPECam)

Christol Georges Manon has also been 12 years at the head of the Mission for the Development and Management of Industrial Zones (MAGZI).

While Olivier Mekulu Mvondo Akame is the General Manager of the National Social Insurance Fund (CNPS), since 2008, 11 years ago.

It is vital to include in this report that the Board Chairs have served several decades in their respective public companies.

By Soter Tarh Agbaw-Ebai with files

10, December 2019

French Cameroun: Yaounde launches platform to boost youth employment ⁰

YouthConnekt, a platform intended to boost youth entrepreneurship, job creation and social cohesion was launched in Cameroon on Monday.

Cameroon’s Minister of Youth Affairs and Civic Education, Mounouna Foutso, said the initiative will connect and empower Cameroonian youth with skills to fully take part in the development of the country.

“We have realized that many Cameroonian youths are not connected. We are now offering them this platform to connect to opportunities wherever they are found,” Foutso told reporters.

Over 5,000 youths including football star, Samuel Eto’o, attended Monday’s launch ceremony in the capital Yaounde.

YouthConnekt is a joint UN-Government initiative that seeks to connect young people to diverse socio-economic and political opportunities in order to optimize their empowerment and facilitate their full participation in development.

The initiative launched in 2012 in Rwanda is present in 12 African Countries.

“I encourage every young Cameroonian to seize the opportunities offered by YouthConnekt following the launching of the initiative in Cameroon. Our dear and beautiful country will be built in peace with the youth,” Cameroonian President Paul Biya tweeted immediately after the launch ceremony.

Source: Xinhuanet

8, December 2019

How the France-backed African CFA franc works as an enabler and barrier to development ⁰

Last month Benin president Patrice Talon shook the establishment table of France-Africa relations when he said in an interview the Francophone nations in West Africa want take more control over their CFA franc currency and plan to move some of their reserves away from France

“Psychologically, with regards to the vision of sovereignty and managing your own money, it’s not good that this model continues,” is reported to have told Radio France Internationale.

But while Talon’s comments was a something of a surprise, it was no longer a shock. Where once the idea of the questioning the status of the France-backed CFA franc seemed heresy, discussions around its future are becoming more common both from grassroots activists and in offices of African governments and opposition leaders.

Earlier this year, Luigi Di Maio, Italy’s former deputy prime minister and current minister of foreign affairs revived the controversy about the role of the CFA franc on Africa’s development with a provocative statement:“France is one of those countries that by printing money for 14 African states prevents their economic development and contributes to the fact that the refugees leave and then die in the sea or arrive on our coasts.”

Although President Emmanuel Macron of France said he would “not respond” to the statement, he did note that in the past “France will go along with the solution put forward by your [African] leaders.” The statement, however, has brought to question the CFA franc currency zone, the relations between the 14 countries within the CFA zone and France, and their impact on economic and development performance.

There is also a clear divergence in opinion among African leaders using the currency. In a recent trip to France, president Alassane Ouattara of Cote d’Ivoire qualified the discussion about the CFA franc as a “false debate,” considering that the currency is “solid and well-managed” as well as “stabilizing” African economies.

But Chad’s president Idriss Debby said back in 2015 he considers the CFA as “pulling African economies down,” and that “time has come to cut the cordon that prevent Africa to develop.” He called for a restructuring of the currency in order to “enable African countries which are still using it to develop.”

In my book Innovating Development strategies in Africa: The Role of International, Regional, and National Actors, I examine the political economy of the performance and economic development strategies of the countries from CFA franc zone from 1960 to 2010. Building on it and additional research, it is important to address this debate dispassionately with impartial analysis of how the CFA works, the arguments of its supporters and opponents both academically and politically, its broader impact on economic performance, and the options ahead.

The origin story

France’s Treasury guaranteed the CFA Franc under a fixed exchange rate dependent on the deposit of 50% of its reserves in the French central bank

The CFA franc was created in December 1945 when the French government ratified the Bretton Woods Agreement and became the currency of les colonies françaises de l’Afrique or the CFA (“French Colonies of Africa”). The French Treasury guaranteed the currency under a fixed exchange rate dependent on the deposit of 50% of CFA franc reserves into the French central bank. The CFA was later split into the Communauté Financière d’Afrique (“Financial Community of Africa”) which included the West African countries Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo and the Communauté Financière de l’Afrique Centrale(“Financial Community of Central Africa”) including Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon.

The Central Bank of West African States and the Bank of Central African States are responsible for coordinating monetary exchanges through operating accounts with the French Treasury. These accounts operate according to several rules, including:

Each central bank must maintain at least 50% of foreign assets with the French Treasury,
Foreign exchange cover of at least 20% should be maintained for “sight liabilities”
Each government is limited to a ceiling of 20% of that country’s revenue from the previous year.

The CFA franc monetary system is designed to guarantee the franc currency in international markets, while simultaneously preventing overdraft and inflation in CFA member countries. Between the early 1950s and the mid-1980s, CFA franc countries had stronger real GDP growth and lower inflation than other sub-Saharan African countries. For example, within the past fifty years, Côte d’Ivoire experienced an average inflation rate of 6%— a much lower rate than its neighbor Ghana, which averaged 29% inflation.

From 1960 to 1978, Cote d’Ivoire averaged an annual GDP growth rate of 9.5%, which then stagnated, while Ghana’s GDP responded positively to structural adjustment programs in the 1980s. Cote d’Ivoire, among other CFA countries, did not respond immediately to structural adjustment programs. Strong growth and low inflation from the early independence period did not survive the economic shocks of 1986 to 1993, and the CFA became significantly overvalued and subject to increasing deficits in the French Treasury’s operations accounts. Domestic production lapsed, and African countries increasingly relied on imported materials. CFA countries’ public debt increased and central banks exceeded statutory ceilings, leading to significant fiscal imbalances.

A woman hands over a 10,000 CFA ($16.50) note to pay for food during the attieke and fish festival in Abidjan, Ivory Coast,

In 1994, France devalued the CFA franc, raising the parity rate from 50 CFA francs per French franc to 100 CFA francs per French franc. CFA member countries’ governments imposed wage freezes and layoffs in the wake of the CFA devaluation, leading to widespread unrest over inaccessible goods for consumers and unmanageable price controls for suppliers.

Then Senegalese president Abdou Diouf had promised citizens during his 1993 campaign that franc would not be devalued. So in 1994 thousands of demonstrators responded to this broken promise as many suffered the effects of France bowing to Western pressure to increase the CFA franc’s parity rate. Just one month before the devaluation, Michel Roussin, the French Cooperation Minister, had said there was no chance at devaluing the CFA Franc because France was “very attached to the Franc Zone”.

Growing debates

The challenge of implementing effective monetary policies for growth and stability throughout Africa has led to years of debate over the CFA franc zone. Many European and African leaders have supported its continuation, while others seek separation between France, the European Union, and Francophone African countries.

The debates over the CFA franc often begin with the question of exchange rates and devaluation. Studies have shown that the CFA franc’s convertibility at a fixed exchange rate was the impetus for the 1994 devaluation; an average of 730 million French francs was being converted each month before 1992, which was a massive increase from the less than 284 million French francs converted monthly before 1984.

All the presidents. Burkina Faso’s Roch Marc Christian Kabore, Mauritania’s Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, France’s Emmanuel Macron, Mali’s Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, Chad’s Idriss Deby and Niger’s Mahamadou Issoufou pose during G5 Sahel Summit in Bamako, Mali, July 2, 2017.

Monetary policies that were effective in achieving real exchange rate depreciation also resulted in a reduction in government expenditures and a decline in investment. As a positive effect, the unlimited convertibility of the CFA franc to the euro has generally reduced the risk of foreign investment in CFA countries. Though, foreign investment in CFA countries remains low relative to other emerging economies, such as the BRICS economies that include South Africa.

Guinea, which has its own currency, still stands as an example for supporters of the CFA zone. Guinea frequently experiences currency shortages and its central bank does not have sufficient policies to ensure stability, so the CFA zone is presented as a solution to instability in this particular case.

Côte d’Ivoire president Alassane Ouattara has in the recent past contended that CFA zone countries are better off than Anglophone countries due to growth and low inflation, whereas the poor are disproportionately affected by unpredictable inflation in Anglophone countries. What is rarely discussed is that similar or better outcomes could be achieved with other policy options.

In terms of trade, the CFA’s fixed exchange rate to the euro has led to a greater facilitation of trade through the reduction of uncertainty and stabilization of domestic prices. The logic of fixed exchange rates traces back to the Bretton Woods period when 63% of developing countries had their currency pegged to that of an industrial country.

The potential problems with a fixed exchange rate are mostly offset in Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CAEMU) countries, due to these countries’ high levels of excess liquidity from oil revenues. However, West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries have experienced declining liquidity since 2004, thus suffering from the volatility of a fixed rate amidst external shocks.

Ideally, countries in the same monetary union should coordinate member countries’ fiscal policies to offset shocks in different parts of the union. However, no such coordination occurs in the CFA zone.

The CFA franc zone as a whole has thus resulted in:

Limited intra-regional trade, especially in Central Africa.
High dependence on producing and exporting a limited number of primary commodities.
A narrow industrial base.
A high vulnerability to external shocks.

A focus on primary commodities and limited intra-regional trade are broadly reflective of CFA franc member countries’ lack of export diversification and low industrialization. Intra-regional trade accounted for about 11% of total external trade of WAEMU countries, 6% of CAEMU countries, and only 9% of all CFA countries’ total external trade.The CFA franc’s fixed exchange rate is vulnerable to being a pawn on international markets to the detriment of the African economies.

The French government again considered devaluation in 2012, which, while disregarded as a rumor, was assumed to be a method of safeguarding the euro and maintain France’s credit rating. The CFA franc’s exchange rate could thus become a pawn in international markets to the detriment of CFA economies. In 2014, a drop in oil prices increased fiscal and current-account deficits within the monetary zone. Though, African leaders agreed to IMF-supported programs that inspired spending cuts to remedy the deficits instead of changing the exchange rate. This adamant support for the CFA franc’s peg to the Euro challenges the perspective that only European leaders support the fixed rate of CFA francs to Euros.

Debates over the persistence of the CFA franc zone also focus on African states’ independence and sovereignty. Large numbers of unemployed youth throughout sub-Saharan Africa—which may reach over 350 million over the next two decades—are often the loudest opponents of the CFA zone. Other pro-democracy movements, like Y’en a Marre in Senegal and Le Balai Citoyen in Burkina Faso, consider the dismantling of the CFA zone as essential to their campaigns to reform their countries’ respective governments. Other protests have included Kemi Seba, the Benin-born French activist who was charged with burning CFA notes in Senegal before being deported.

Some African economists consider the broader dependency on European monetary policies as a restriction to growth due to a hyper-fixation on inflation. However, African elite and wealthy individuals, the primary beneficiaries of the CFA franc zone configuration, support its continuation. Thus, debates will continue within the various dimensions of class, power, and politics.

The future

Scholars and policymakers have proposed several options to improve the viability of the CFA franc or replace the currency. Each option has advocates and opponents because the different policies target distinct challenges, such as exchange rate independence, inflation control, GDP-growth incentives, and capital mobility. The four most prominent options are to:

l. Tie the CFA franc to a basket of currencies, such as the dollar and the yuan. Pegging the CFA franc to multiple currencies will increase the relative stability of the currency in the event of exchange rate fluctuations of any of WAEMU or CAEMU’s trading partners. A basket peg based on an import-weighted index, as proposed by Crokett and Nsouli (1977), has also been evidenced to be more beneficial for developing countries. An import-weighted index would be most beneficial for WAEMU due to its high levels of import diversification, while a different configuration, such as an export-weighted index, a bilateral trade index, or an index based on the SDR (special drawing rights) might be more appropriate for the CAEMU zone that is highly focused on primary commodities. Though, in general, severe depreciation of basket currencies would have much graver effects on countries that mainly export primary products, such as CFA countries.

2. Restructure the reserve requirements for CFA franc countries. Higher levels of reserves will ensure the convertibility of the CFA franc, which is currently threatened by changing French and European fiscal policies. This option could be considered a short-term strategy, or precursor to other strategies, that may lead to greater monetary independence for CFA countries. However, in many CFA member countries, high reserves are derived from natural resource revenues, which are subject to changes in world prices and difficult to accommodate in the short-term.

3. Separate WAEMU and CAEMU into optimum currency areas. Optimum currency areas (OCA) have the benefits of high factor mobility, economic interdependence, sectoral diversification, and wage and price flexibility. The challenge is to support the costs related to the establishment of OCAs and ensure the establishment and compliance of uniform regulations. Though undoubtedly difficult to implement, this configuration could likely benefit both monetary unions because member states’ fiscal policies will be easier to coordinate within a similar regional context. Some research suggests West African CFA members of ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States, are already primed to become an OCA because these countries are best suited to integrate their real exchange rates. Although ECOWAS is mulling the launch of “Eco,” a new currency to be used by its 15 member states, including Nigeria, Aloysius Uche Ordu, former Vice President of the African Development Bank recently evaluated its prospects, and argues launching Eco by January 2020 “is, at best, an expensive distraction that the people of West Africa can ill afford at this particular moment”.

4. The establishment of the African Monetary Union. An African Monetary Union would be most challenging to implement and require countries to adhere to strict fiscal rules similar to the CFA zone until stability was achieved. This strategy requires significant investment and capital mobility to ensure a strong exchange rate union and currency convertibility. Movement of labor and capital are necessary to spur economic growth and stabilize relatively different economies. The appeal of an integrated African Monetary Union is the tremendous potential to increase intra-regional trade and encourage domestic production capabilities. However, another monetary union may lead to similar problems of dependence as the CFA franc zone.

Overall, policymakers from the CFA franc zone should analyze the various options to determine a short-term and long-term plan that will increase growth and lead to equitable development of countries that are at different stages. African and European leaders must be resolute and accountable to the various interest groups throughout their two continents.

Any restructuring of the CFA franc will have drastic macroeconomic effects that will require an increase to public investment and provision of public goods, attractive investment policies, development aid, and resource mobilization. The future of the CFA franc is yet to be determined, but it deserves comprehensive, sensitive analysis.

Source: Quartz Africa

28, November 2019

Cameroon launches mobile money service aggregation platform ⁰

Cameroon’s communication minister has signed a decree setting the conditions and operating rules for USSD for access to the national electronic communications aggregation platform, Business In Cameroon reported. This platform aims to ensure fair interconnection conditions, reduce the costs of mobile financial transactions, and promote financial inclusion. It will give access to mobile financial services via the shortcode hash 237 hash.

Philemon Zo’o Zame, director of the Telecommunications Regulatory Agency (ART), said the platform is housed at the state postal service Campost, which manages it and is responsible for implementing the decree. Zo’o Zame is inviting network operators and electronic communications service providers to connect to it within 30 days, by 26 December, for the provision of mobile financial services.

Source: Telecompaper

25, November 2019

Bank of Ambazonia to issue $10 Million bonds ⁰

Credible sources within the Interim Government of the Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) have confirmed that Vice President Dabney Yerima will be announcing the creation of “THE BANK OF AMBAZONIA (BOA) and Chairman of the Board of Governors today November 25th, 2019. The Bank of Ambazonia, AKA “The Ambazonian Njangi House” is an organized all-inclusive Semi-Autonomous Informal Financial Structure (Shadow Bank) with credible representatives from constituent components of the revolution. This will provide the Ambazonian people and communities with alternative but safe sources of funding for Southern Cameroons Restoration without generating additional systemic risk.

Our sources are informed that this decision is guided by sound advice from the international community, Americans and encouraging statements from the Undersecretary of State for African Affairs, Tibor Nagy. The Interim Government is quickly learning to adapt to the fast-changing nature of the Southern Cameroons Restoration quest. After listening to the calls for a more accountable, transparent and inclusive financial structure to better mobilize resources to fund our Restoration, the Interim Government has opted to go back to basics and apply what has worked best for The Southern Cameroons community for the past 58 years.

“The successive murderous regimes in Cameroun shutdown The Southern Cameroons venerable Cameroon Bank and other major financial institutions that served our communities and completely limited access to money and formal financial institutions from our people. However, they underestimated the innovation and resilience of our people in surviving within this system. The sheer determination to survive and develop our communities for the past 58 years of occupation resulted in the establishment of a very robust informal financial sector call “NJANGI HOUSES” (Shadow Banks), that revolutionized economic development and self-reliance of our people to lean on each other” stated Brado Tabenyang Etchu, the Secretary of State for Economy and Finance.

Most of the development and education of the Southern Cameroons communities has been made possible through the proceeds of NJANGI HOUSES. The people of Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) are again currently faced with similar, but monumental challenges in their quest to restore their independence. The international community and major financial institutions have shutdown access to funding from the Southern Cameroons community to help them prosecute this war of liberation from colonial Cameroun.

The Interim Government has concluded that we are on our own and must rely on our own innovative ways to fund this quest for liberation and there is nothing that has made our people and communities more self-reliant than our innovative NJANGI HOUSE initiatives and it is this inspiration that has guided the Interim Government to form the people’s bank.

“We must keep the enemy wondering because a bank gives us another element of surprise and institutional credibility” The government of Cameroun is incurring and mortgaging our resources to prosecute its genocidal war against our people and we cannot continue to idly watch and do nothing” noted VP Dabney Yerima.

The Bank through its Board of Governors will immediately certify the issuance of $10 million high interest yielding AmbaFreedomBonds (AFB) to the public for sale. Proceeds from the sales of these bonds will go towards financing of the revolution. We are going to incur these liabilities to defend and provide humanitarian relief to our refugees and IDPs and these liabilities are going to be part of any negotiations with the government of Cameroun and the world must take note. Southern Cameroonians and are encouraged to own a piece of their country and patronize the purchase of these bonds as a means to fund the struggle by going to www.ambabondholders.com Bundlers/professional sales agents will be used with a bonds-based commission redeemed at time of bond maturity. Your Bond, Your Freedom!

24, November 2019

Dangote Cameroon sees 6% sales drop in 9M19 ⁰

In the first nine months of 2019, Dangote Cameroon reported a decrease in its domestic performance with sales down six per cent.

“Our 1.5Mta clinker mill in Douala sold about 866,000t of cement in the first nine months of 2019, down six per cent from 920,000t sold in the same period in 2018. We estimate that our market share was 40 per cent during the period,” said the group.

The decline in performance has been attributed by the company due to persistent security problems in the northwest and southwest regions, where economic activity has been slowing down due to fighting between secessionists and defence forces.

In the first half of this year, Dangote had already reported a decline in activity, seeing its sales at 0.6Mt, or down 7.1 per cent YoY.

Published under Cement News

24, November 2019

Biya says greater efforts needed to revamp central African economy ⁰

Cameroonian president Paul Biya on Friday called for greater efforts to develop the economy of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC).

“The volatility of prices of raw material continues to affect our economies, so we need to diversify more than ever before. Security challenges continue to have much pressure on our public finances,” Biya said in the capital Yaounde at the opening of the Extraordinary Summit of CEMAC Heads of State.

“Our common objective remains the acceleration of growth to respond to the legitimate needs of our population and particularly young people in terms of employment,” he added.

CEMAC growth rate stood at 1.8 percent in 2018, and inflation went above 3 percent, in spite of an uncertain world macroeconomic characterized by geopolitical and commercial tensions, Biya said.

“Our sub-region is resolute to continue its efforts to attain sustainable development and progress in spite of the obstacles it might encounter,” he said.

The summit is expected to “come up with a blueprint” that will “considerably” enhance regional integration and boost trade ties among member countries, according to CEMAC officials.

CEMAC is made up of Gabon, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of the Congo, and Equatorial Guinea. With a total population of about 37 million, it was established to promote cooperation and exchange among its members.

Source: Xinhuanet

22, November 2019

China Is Not In Africa For Charity, But To Control Its Resources ⁰

Africa is on the cusp of a new period in its history, its renaissance. Freed from centuries of colonialism and neo-imperialism, Africa has the opportunity to become a center of economic might to provide prosperity to the continent’s growing population. Yet, at present, Africa unfortunately faces a new danger: Sino-imperialism, the risk of falling under the control of China largely through Chinese economic investment and loans. The People’s Republic of China has long supported African states since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power in 1949. Under Mao, China’s backed African liberation movements in an effort to advance Maoism and offset Soviet and American influence. In much of Africa today, China is the imperialist power.

China is in Africa now not to advance Maoism, but to control its resources, people, and potential. From building railways in Kenya and roads in rural Ethiopia to running mines in the Congo, China has drastically changed the African economic landscape in the twentieth century. China lent nearly $125 billion to Africa between 2000 and 2006 and recently pledged $60 billion at the 2018 Forum on China-Africa Co-operation. The Chinese superficially appear to maintain a mutually beneficial relationship with Africa by providing financial and technical assistance to Africa’s pressing developmental needs. Trade between China and Africa has grown from $10 billion in 2000 to $190 billion by 2017. It is estimated that 12 percent of Africa industrial production, or $500 billion annually—nearly half of Africa’s internationally contracted construction market—is carried out by Chinese firms.

China’s activities in the African continent have yet to receive the attention they deserve in the West. China’s behavior in Africa is important for three major reasons. First, China is the source of significant investment capital twinned with a prodigious ability to create infrastructure, both of which are needed by many African states. Second, China’s behavior in Africa provides the rest of the world with insight into how it will behave towards other states, particularly the states of the Global South, as it becomes equal in power with the United States. Third, what China is doing in Africa does not augur well for the rest of the world. China’s activities and behavior in Africa may only be described as neo-colonial and exploitative of African peoples and the environment.

China’s abusive behavior towards African states has occurred for decades. In 2007, Guy Scott, the former agricultural minister in the Zambian government told The Guardian, “We’ve had bad people before. The whites were bad, the Indians were worse, but the Chinese are worst of all.” But Sino-imperialism is getting worse as China grows in power and seeks evermore resources.

There are copious examples of the negative consequences of Sino-imperialism. One archetypical case is the China National Petroleum Corporation, the state-owned oil and gas company, which is a major investor operating in South Sudanese oil fields. The Chinese pollute the local environment with impunity, resulting in children born with deformities, the poisoning of livestock, destruction of fertile land, and the pollution of rivers. Additionally, the Chinese cause environmental destruction in the Northern Upper Nile and Ruweng states affects the indigenous Dinka Padang communities of South Sudan. The Chinese help produce oil generating revenue and economic opportunities but are not bound with environmental standards.

The Chinese influence in South Sudan also results from road construction and infrastructure development. South Sudan will provide thirty thousand barrels per day of crude to the Export-Import Bank of China to fund the construction of roads and infrastructure development. This includes the construction of a 392-kilometer (244-mile) road from Juba to Rumbek and from Juba to Nadapal on the Kenyan border, which is being built by a Chinese firm using Chinese technology and manpower.

South Sudan’s neighbors, Ethiopia and Kenya, received loans for infrastructure projects from the Chinese. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative has introduced dynamic infrastructure projects such as the Standard Gauge Railway. The railway connects Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya. The railway was Ethiopia’s first railway in over a century and Africa’s first fully electrified line. The railways cuts travel time from the capital Addis Ababa to Djibouti from two days by road to twelve hours.

The Standard Gauge Railway appears to be providing revolutionary infrastructure to stimulate economic growth, but the details demand scrutiny. The project cost nearly $4.5 billion, partly financed by the China Export-Import Bank. The railway uses Chinese trains, Chinese construction companies, Chinese standards and specifications, and operated by the China Railway Group Limited (CREC) and China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation.

As might be expected from this Sino-imperialist project, the railway has been plagued with technical and financial challenges, which calls into question Ethiopia’s dependence on Chinese technology and debt-finance. The African country is struggling to repay its loan to China and reap the benefits of this dynamic infrastructure project. In 2018, Addis Ababa negotiated with China and structured its loan terms from fifteen to thirty years. In next door Kenya, as a result of heavy borrowing by the government, China may seize the port of Mombasa. According to Kenya’s Daily Nation newspaper, the terms are Draconian and state “neither the borrower [Kenya] nor any of its assets is entitled to any right of immunity on the grounds of sovereignty, with respect to its obligations.”

In addition to these abuses, the Chinese presence in Africa is defined by a purposeful isolation from the indigenous population. Chinese firms bring in their own drivers, construction workers, and support staff, denying these employment opportunities to Africans, and often live apart from the African societies in which they reside.

These activities are only an example of China’s abusive behavior in Africa. Africa endured colonialism and neo-imperialism for hundreds of years. Just as Africa has freed itself from those bonds, it needs to work with the West and other states to provide alternatives to Chinese money and infrastructure. The greatest threat Africa faces today is Sino-imperialism. It is now in danger of being captured by China’s sinister Sino-imperialism that will keep Africa from entering its renaissance.

Source: The National Interest