A list of 67 suspicious transactions scheduled for investigation by Cameroon’s tax agency shows a total equivalent of $656 million in undeclared payments from state coffers to questionable business entities and individuals. The list, obtained by the Arizona Project team in Cameroon (see box at end of article), covers the period 2017 to 2021 and contains the names of beneficiaries with foreign connections, some real and some possibly fake.

However, the tax investigations, initiated by former tax agency Director-General Mopa Fatoing, seem to have been snuffed out. No results have been forthcoming and Mr Fatoing was recently removed from his post by Cameroon’s President, Paul Biya.

This is another finding of the Arizona Project (See story: ‘The murder of Martinez Zogo’) investigation into the murder of journalist Martinez Zogo, which was conducted by Cameroonian and West African journalists in ZAM’s partner Network of African Investigative Reporters and Editors (NAIRE), together with the ZAM platform itself and international partners in Italy, Nigeria, Togo, and Equatorial Guinea (see credit box). There are no indications whatsoever that any one of the individuals named on the list -except for Jean-Pierre Amougou Belinga, who is now jailed on charges in connection with the case- have anything to do with the murder of Martinez Zogo. But the journalist’s gruesome killing created a climate of terror and silence in which any and all corruption investigations in Cameroon, including the tax agency’s list of 67 cases, came to a standstill.

A terse letter

According to a letter written by former tax Director-General Mopa Modeste Fatoing, his office was put on the trail of the 67 cases by the state’s own anti-corruption agency, ANIF (L’Agence Nationale d’investigation Financière). ANIF investigates fraud and money laundering concerning state finances and is attached to the Ministry of Finance. The letter, which was attached to the Excel spreadsheet of the 67 transactions, is dated 5 July 2021. It is addressed by Fatoing to his revenue service’s “monsieur le chef de division des enquêtes, de la programmation et du suivi des controles,” i.e. the investigations divisions chief.

The tone of the letter is terse. “I had already instructed you to follow up on (the list),” he wrote. “Up to today, these instructions have not been followed. ANIF needs dossier numbers to work with.” However, little has been heard from the tax office on the list of 67. Mr Fatoing was removed and posted to an office position at the IMF in Washington on 26 January 2023, a mere four days after the murdered body of Martinez Zogo was found in the Cameroonian capital Yaoundé.

Titled “état des dossiers programmables” (“status of cases to be scheduled”), the Excel sheet containing the 67 payment lines shows that the tax agency is, or at least was, concerned that individuals with access to Cameroon’s state budget paid out massive amounts of state money for mostly unclear services between 2017 and 2021 to, inter alia, foreign exchange and money transfer companies, mining and wood logging companies, tourist and transport companies, hotels and financial consulting companies. In twenty-nine of the sixty-seven cases, there was no indication of what the money was for.

The 67 transactions also include a substantial number of payments to companies connected to media mogul Amougou Belinga, who was arrested in January 2023 on charges in connection with the murder of Martinez Zogo and for which he is still awaiting trial (See story: ‘The life and trials of a media tycoon’). According to the spreadsheet, Belinga’s companies could have received payments amounting to the FCFA equivalent of $125 million. But even though Belinga’s cases have largely been made public in Cameroon, were very publicly investigated by the tax authorities, and form the background of the current charges against him in the Martinez Zogo case, he is not the biggest fish to be found in the tax agency’s Excel sheet (1). That is an Italian called Eugenio Matarazzi, whose forestry company Société Industrielle de Mbang (SIM) appears to have received more than double that: over $273 million for “wood logging” in one transaction alone. According to the spreadsheet, Matarazzi also received $200,000 personally (see below for SIM’s and Matarazzi’s comments).

The Italian link

Unrelated to the tax case, Arizona Project Team partner Edoardo Anziano of IRPI (Investigative Reporting Project Italy, found that Matarazzi’s company has a reputation for illegal logging in Cameroon. In 2004, Anziano reports, the NGO Global Witness found irregularities in forest concessions where SIM was subcontracted by another company. In one case, this company “through its sub-contractor SIM” was found guilty of “timber extraction out of the limits (…), of failure in marking the stumps and trees, and of abandoning the timber produced.” In 2005, the following year, the NGO Greenpeace claimed that “the Cameroonian-based timber company Société Industrielle de Mbang (SIM) is involved in large-scale illegal logging in Cameroon, both directly and indirectly.”

Reports from local communities allegedly affected by SIM’s logging operations align with these accusations. “In the Mbam et Kim region, this company now has a virtual monopoly on logging operations, which it has won with the active support of a highly influential local elite,” a senior official of the Ministry of Forests and Wildlife told the news site Cameroun24. According to the Association des Journalistes Africains pour l’Environnement (Association of Environmental Journalists) in Cameroon, other officials have defined SIM’s activities as “illegal plundering of forests.”

The forestry minister helped, forest communities protested

According to a Facebook post from 2015 about a visit to Italy organised by the “Cameroon-Italy Friendship Association”, both the Italian ambassador to Cameroon and Matarazzi were present at a dinner organised by Theodore Datouo, the deputy speaker of the Cameroonian parliament. But Datouo is only one of a number of influential contacts of Matarazzi in Cameroon. His principal ally is forestry minister Jules Doret Ndongo, who has extended many forest concessions to SIM and has, according to a reliable source, also been instrumental in granting public money to SIM after it threatened to declare bankruptcy and lay off hundreds of its staff unless it was granted government assistance.

In 2020, community representatives of the eastern region of Lom and Djerem in Cameroon wrote to Doret Ndongo to ask him to stop yet another concession to SIM “because our water comes from the forest,” according to news site Stopblabla.com.

We could not establish if the concession continued regardless.

Both Matarazzi’s contacts Datouo and Ndongo are reportedly close to Chantal Biya, the wife of Cameroon’s President Paul Biya.

In a letter sent in response to questions, SIM said that it does not ‘sell anything to the state of Cameroon’ and that it also ‘has never requested and does not receive state subsidies’, adding that Mr. Eugenio Matarazzi ‘has never requested or obtained money from the Cameroonian state.’ SIM attached tax certificates, dated 13 and 15 June 2023, declaring that neither it nor Mr Matarazzi owe any tax to the state of Cameroon. It also attached confirmation of a tax audit, dated 15 February 2022,, that covered the four years 2017, 2018, 21019, 2020, i.e. the same period as the list in ZAM’s possession. The tax audit confirmation letter reads, inter alia, that ‘envisaged adjustments were brought to the attention of the taxpayer.’ In its letter, SIM cites this, adding that ‘to our knowledge, this verification did not reveal the criminal acts which would have been reported to you.’ With regard to the reported irregularities in SIM’s forest concessions, the company said that “in Cameroon, forest concessions are awarded by the State and in particular the Ministry in charge of public procurement on the basis of objective criteria and following an open and transparent procedure. It is not uncommon for losers to cry out about “unfair competition” and “fraud”.” The company reiterated that accusations of irregularities, illegal logging, plunder and benefiting from elite connections are part of such “smear campaigns”.

Another major recipient of state money on the list of 67 is a foreign exchange company based in Maroua in the far northern part of Cameroon, which borders Chad and Nigeria: it received the equivalent of $227 million for unspecified services. A third recipient, a company that goes by its abbreviation, FINEX, received $38 million for “transport.” This appears to show that the government paid the real bus company First National Express FINEX for travel, which it provides between Cameroon’s two main cities Yaoundé and Douala. However, close scrutiny through the Orbis company database reveals that the FINEX beneficiary listed on the spreadsheet is a different company. The one on the list has (among other numbers) a Mauritanian phone number, is in shipping, and is represented by a person whose phone number is in Yaoundé but whose email address appears to be from within the French multinational construction company Bolloré network.

“No road like that”

Also in the top ten, in 6th and 7th place respectively, are two directors of companies in Nigeria, who were paid the equivalent of $13 million and $7 million respectively. The first director’s company could not be traced to its registered address at 10 Market Road in Uyo, the capital of Akwa Ibom state in Nigeria’s South-South. Colleagues from the Nigerian online news platform the Premium Times (PT) www.premiumtimesng.com, who went to check in Uyo, were told that “it does not exist” by local residents, cab drivers and other transport operators. The Chairperson of the Uyo Local Government Area, Uwemedimo Udo, told the team in a text message, “No road like that to my knowledge, please.”

The PT team also could not find the second director’s company at its registered address of Plot 3, block 38, Yinka Bello street off Admirality Way 12 in Lekki Phase 1, Lagos. “The occupants of the building in the said address are Lagos Bridge Hotel,” the PT team reported. “An official of the hotel said they have occupied the space since 2006, three years before the incorporation of (the company you are looking for).” Neither of the two companies seems to have a website, and an extensive search shows that they don’t have an online presence on social networking platforms. “All efforts to retrieve contacts for the individuals or their company ask them for comment proved futile,” reported the PT team.

A person listed in 9th place is based in Jaipur, India and received $5.6 million for unspecified services. We could not find any functional contact details for the businessman, but a person matching the name and the Cameroonian company registration is listed as chairing a company in “raw farm products” with headquarters in Singapore, which does not appear to have a website, nor a contact address or email. It shares its Singapore address with a shipping company. The same individual is also listed as a director of a travel company with offices in Abuja and Kano in Nigeria, but there was no response at either of the two listed office telephone numbers when the Premium Times team tried to call. No contacts could be found for two other companies registered to the same person in Benin either. In 10th place is a company in Yaoundé, which received $5.5 million, also for unspecified services. According to its Yaoundé registration, the entity does market research into “wellness,” but no response was obtained from emails and phone calls to the listed contacts.

Foldout or box

The case of Baba Danpoulo and his friendship with the president

The payment amounts for the last seven entries on the tax agency Excel sheet are left blank, which means that one cannot assess how much these entities received from Cameroon state budgets. Most remarkably, among these seven entries is the name of Baba Danpoulo, a multi-millionaire reputed to be one of Africa’s ten richest men and a personal friend of President Paul Biya. Danpoulo, who claims to be worth at least $940 million, stands accused by South Africa’s First National Bank of defaulting on loan and interest repayments to the extent of $165 million, for which FNB has attached buildings he bought with his loans in South Africa, including the Thibault building in Cape Town and a 32-storey high rise in Johannesburg.

In response and amid much outrage in Cameroon government circles, a Cameroon court froze the bank accounts of two South African companies operating in Cameroon, the mobile network MTN and Tiger Brands subsidiary Chococam, in November 2022. The two companies recently approached a higher court in Cameroon for leave to appeal this action. This retaliation has been called “ridiculous” by an anonymous “advocate who specialises in international law” in Cameroon. The advocate published an in-depth analysis of the wrangle in Cameroonian media, agreeing with South Africa’s foreign affairs minister Naledi Pandor that such acts “damage international relations.” “And we are not even asking where Baba Danpoulo got all his wealth from,” the advocate commented.

Baba Danpoulo’s lawyer Aggée Mbanzehe said in response to questions that “these are very sensitive and I need to discuss with my client.” When approached again four days later, Mbanzehe reiterated that “Mr Baba is not around and I need his special authorisation to give any information about those sensitive issues.”

Among the next twenty listed beneficiaries from payments ranging from $4.5 to $1.5 million are: a mining company registered in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, that does not appear to have a website or a functioning email address; a construction company registered in Oman; an import-export company registered in Nigeria under a Nigerian representative but with a Cameroonian married couple as directors and a person with the same name as a director of a previously sanctioned Belgium-based diamond buying company which does much business in Central Africa. Phone calls to the company’s listed office in Antwerp, made to ask for comment on its inclusion on the tax agency list were left without a response and an email bounced. A travel company with branches in Togo, whose director, according to our investigative partner in Togo, is from Benin, would have received close to $2 million from Cameroonian state coffers. The director, who was reached by phone, denied this, saying he or his companies had never received any payment from the state of Cameroon.

A money transfer company with offices in Equatorial Guinea as well as in Cameroon features in 23rd place on the list and has, according to the tax agency’s spreadsheet, received over $1.5 million. Colleagues from the Equatorial Guinean Diario Rombe, which operates from exile in Spain, knew of this company as connected to ruling circles in that country.  Upon investigating, they discovered that, on the business site ZoomInfo, the company is listed at a New York address with a number of US-based representatives. However, the same people appear on several similar-looking websites with what are probably stock photos, exactly the same every time, while the contact phone number listed on ZoomInfo is still Cameroonian.

“Customers left high and dry”

The same money transfer company has recently been the target of much outrage in Cameroon. A local colleague reports, “It stopped paying out money that came from (the diaspora in) Europe. It even closed its doors. It is rumoured that some Africans in the diaspora with a base in Strasbourg, France have accumulated money abroad and customers in Cameroon have been left high and dry.”

A phone call by the local colleague to the company’s branch in Akwa, Douala, was answered by a security man and later by an administrative employee, but neither of these responded to the question of whether operations were ongoing, or where the Cameroonian CEO who has reportedly not been seen for a while, might be reached. All other efforts to contact the company or its representatives for comment on the current situation as well as on its inclusion on the tax agency’s list, whether by email or phone, also remained fruitless.

The company’s website seems only intermittently functional, but its Facebook page still lists Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Strasbourg as its areas of operation. A recent posting on its page by a dissatisfied customer called “Stella Alexis” says “Tsuippp, agence fausse,” which roughly translates as “you are a damn fake agency.”

USA fronts

A number of other companies that feature on the list are ostensibly registered in the United States, but these registrations may, like the money transfer company’s New York registration on ZoomInfo, be fronts for individuals who are resident in Cameroon or Central Africa itself. These individuals may also be using the names and logos of other people, or other real companies, without their knowledge.

A Cameroon-based man, for example, 24th on the list and the recipient of around $1.5 million, is using the logo of a financial consulting company CBIZ based in Cleveland, USA, on his LinkedIn profile, claiming that he is a “documents controller” for CBIZ. A spokesperson for CBIZ in Cleveland told us that they did not know this man, nor have they worked with any Cameroonians.

Another Cameroonian, who according to the tax agency document was paid around $670,000 through his Cameroon-based company for “cellulose products,” mentions on his LinkedIn profile that he lives in Chicago, US. A ZoomInfo page mentions the same man as a co-founder of an identically named company in California, USA. Like CBIZ in Cleveland, the California-based company said in response to questions that they did not know the man, nor have they worked with any Cameroonians.

Our investigations into the cases on the list did not include Amougou Belinga’s companies, since payments from state coffers to him were widely investigated and published in Cameroon, inter alia by Martinez Zogo, already. (To find out more read ‘The murder of Martinez Zogo’).

Foldout

Our correspondence with the International Monetary Fund

On 14 June 2023, ZAM wrote to the IMF in Washington, asking to be connected to former Cameroon Directorate of Taxation Director-General, Modeste Fatoing. Fatoing had been pushing to investigate the 67 cases but was transferred by President Biya to an IMF post in Washington on 26 January 2023, four days after Martinez Zogo’s mutilated body was found in a suburb in Yaoundé. No response to the email was received. ZAM emailed a second time on 20 June 2023, this time including more detail, saying that it was “very important that (Modeste Fatoing) is made aware of questions relating to his posting to the IMF, four days after the murder of journalist Martinez Zogo in Cameroon.” Our email continued to say that our working hypothesis was that “both the murder (of Zogo) and Mr Fatoing’s posting (were) connected to illicit financial flows that the Cameroon revenue service was investigating under the leadership of Mr Fatoing” and that “this investigation appeared to have come to a halt after the murder of Zogo and the removal from Cameroon of Mr Fatoing.” Our email asked that, “in the case that Mr Fatoing is not able or willing, or cannot be enabled by you, to give his views on the above,” the IMF itself answer the following questions:

1. Were or are you aware that Mr Fatoing was posted to the IMF by Cameroon’s president days after the murder of journalist Martinez Zogo?

2. Were or are you aware that Martinez Zogo had forcefully denounced high level corruption, particularly illicit payments to a businessman, Amougou Belinga, who stands accused of having externalised millions of dollars in Cameroon state money towards personal business ventures in France?

3. Were or are you aware that Mr Belinga is now in jail in Cameroon on charges of the murder of Martinez Zogo, whose mutilated body was found on 22 January 2023 in Yaounde?

4. Were or are you aware that the Cameroon revenue service under the leadership of Mr Fatoing was investigating no less than 67 illicit financial outflows from Cameroon state coffers (including ones who benefited Mr Belinga), many of which seem to have ended up in European countries as well as in the United States?

5. Were or are you aware that this investigation has come to a standstill after Mr Fatoing’s departure from Cameroon to the IMF?

6. What is your comment on the current situation, where it appears as if the IMF is sheltering a corruption fighter who has been sidelined from Cameroon?

7. Protective as such shelter might be to Mr Fatoing, how does the IMF envisage proceeding vis a vis Cameroon, where monetary and financial policy appear not to be in good order and corruption fighting institutions, as well as the revenue service, are noticeably silent after the murder of Martinez Zogo and the removal of Mr Fatoing?

8. Does the IMF aim to encourage good financial governance in countries like Cameroon and if so, how does it do that? Our email ended with the sentence that “we would very much like to include your and Mr Modeste Fatoing’s comments for our publication.”

To this email, an IMF spokesperson responded on the same day, 20-6-2023, that:

* The issues concerning the work done by the tax agency in Cameroon are best dealt with by the relevant institutions in Cameroon. It is not in the IMF’s purview to comment on this.

* To clarify, the employment of IMF staff is based on a rigorous and impartial recruitment process that is driven by IMF guidelines and international best practices for recruitment. Modeste Fatoing Mopa was competitively selected to the position of Head of TADAT secretariat in our Fiscal Affairs Department in a process that attracted several internal and external candidates. Modeste started his functions at the IMF on February 6, 2023.

The ZAM and NAIRE Arizona Project

The Arizona Project model dates back to 1976, when Arizona Republic reporter Don Bolles, who had been working on stories about land fraud and the Italian-American mafia in Arizona, was blown up in an explosion caused by TNT that had been placed under his car. In response to the murder, Investigative Reporters and Editors (IRE) in the US put together a team of 30 reporters who gathered in Phoenix to finish Bolles’s story. It was the first large-scale collaborative investigative journalism project in history.

After the murder of Martinez Zogo, the Network of African Investigative Reporters and Editors (NAIRE) initiated a discussion with ZAM on the possibilities of carrying out an Arizona Project in Cameroon in order to assist colleagues under siege in that country and retrieve important information. ZAM agreed to use its office as a base for the coordination.

The decision to send colleagues into Cameroon was not taken lightly. It would be risky because of the danger of violence, detention, and torture for which Cameroonian security forces are known. However, NAIRE found members willing to go regardless. They were Selay Kouassi from Ivory Coast, David Dembélé from Mali, and Bram Posthumus, also based in Ivory Coast. They were to work in close contact with Cameroon-based colleagues, who had access to information but could not be exposed for their safety. These colleagues, as much as ZAM and NAIRE would like to credit them in full, cannot be named for the same reason.

Investigations editor Evelyn Groenink worked full-time in the ZAM back office to coordinate the project, serve as liaison, and edit the results.

When the team discovered that illicit financial flows from Cameroon to foreign countries were a crucial factor in the murder of Martinez Zogo, international partners in the Global Investigative Journalism Network were also ready to help. These were:

• The Investigative Reporting Project Italy, in particular reporter Edoardo Anziano, who dived into the case on the Italian side.

• Premium Times reporter Kabiru Yusuf, who, in spite of the investigative publication’s heavy workload, was made available by his editors to work on the Nigerian and USA fronts of the story.

• Diario Rombe (Equatorial Guinea/Spain), which investigated a money transfer agency link between Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea.

• Pierre-Claver Kuvo , editor of De Cive in Togo and coordinator of the Togolese Consortium of Investigative Journalists “Togo Reporting Post”, who focused on the links to Togo and Benin.

ZAM and NAIRE extend their greatest thanks to these colleagues, who worked with (other) African investigative journalists in solidarity.

The project also owes thanks to the Committee for the Protection of Journalists (CPJ), which provided crucial and much-needed advice.

Culled from Premium Times Nigeria

As the war in Ukraine rages on—and the West’s limited attention to Africa focuses on Sudan—the civil war in the Anglophone part of Cameroon meanders along. It continues into its sixth year without any sign of political settlement due not to Western indifference and inaction, but to Western diffidence and actions that send the wrong signals to the kleptocratic regime of President Paul Biya.

France is hardly signaling that it wants to be part of solving the Anglophone crisis peacefully. And despite a strong, bipartisan U.S. Senate resolution passed in January 2021 calling for dialogue to end the conflict, and the Biden administration’s extension of Temporary Protected Status to Cameroonians in June 2022, the White House and State Department have otherwise taken no public action toward promoting peace.

There are lessons from Sudan that will likely remain unlearned in Cameroon until it is too late, when a looming crisis over Biya’s successor could potentially drive conflict from the periphery to the center of the country. Cameroon offers a similar and tragic case study for Western foreign policy toward the continent.

Lack of consequences for military leaders in Sudan since 2019, and lack of support for civil movements and institutions by outside actors, led to a culture of impunity and violence escalating to an all-out struggle for political and economic power. With an impending succession crisis, endless war on the frontiers, a factionalized governing party, and fragmented security forces, Cameroon faces similar risks. Outside actors have not yet grasped that a lack of consequences for those with guns puts everyone without guns in jeopardy.

It’s not that no one is ringing alarm bells about Cameroon. The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide released a brief in May entitled “Preventing and Mitigating Mass Atrocities in Northwest and Southwest Cameroon: Identifying Policy Options,” highlighting the urgent need for global attention. The Norwegian Refugee Council has included Cameroon on its list of the top 10 “most neglected displacement crises” for the fourth year in a row. The International Crisis Group released a report in March that offered some concrete proposals toward political reform.

The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that, given various crises, one out of six Cameroonians needs humanitarian assistance and protection, totaling 4.7 million people. In May, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect confirmed the current official figure of at least 6,000 killed since late 2017 in the Anglophone regions and at least 715,000 displaced. The actual numbers are likely much higher.

With an impending succession crisis, endless war on the frontiers, a factionalized governing party, and fragmented security forces, Cameroon faces similar risks to Sudan.

Over the past six months, as attention focused elsewhere, the situation in Cameroon has gone from bad to worse. Some hope emerged when Canada announced publicly in January that it “welcomes the agreement by the parties to enter a process to reach a comprehensive, peaceful and political resolution of the conflict” and that it had “accepted the mandate to facilitate this process, as part of our commitment to promote peace and security and advance support for democracy and human rights.” Various other domestic groups and external actors, including Pope Francis, quickly announced their support of the Canadian effort.

Three days later, however, the Biya government countered that “it has not entrusted any foreign country or external entity with any role of mediator or facilitator to settle the crisis in the North-West and South-West Regions.” Any nascent momentum toward peace ground to a halt, and suffering persists unabated.

In fact, the Biya regime continues to be rewarded in ways that ensure military repression continues, with no incentive to pursue a negotiated peace nor substantive political reforms. That same week in January that the government denied a Canadian-facilitated peace process, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) released its third review of Cameroon’s economic situation after meetings earlier in the month. This led to yet another tranche ($73 million) for Cameroon after the IMF board met in March. All IMF reports on Cameroon since the original, three-year (2017-2020) Extended Credit Facility emergency bailout gloss over the impact of war, mismanagement, and kleptocracy on economic growth and development outcomes.

The regime is increasingly confident that loans, grants, investment, and humanitarian assistance will keep rolling in no matter what it does.

The IMF’s fourth review, released on June 29, kept that tradition as it unlocked a further $74 million. While it admits, with typical understatement, that “Cameroon’s performance under the program is mixed” and that “three of five indicative targets under the program have been repeatedly missed,” the fourth review never mentions ongoing war and excessive military expenditures.

By April 2023, Cameroonian officials were emboldened enough to publicly announce their intention to regain eligibility under Washington’s African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the preferential trade terms for some African states that former U.S. President Donald Trump removed due to human rights abuses back in 2019. While AGOA eligibility would have minimal impact on Cameroon’s economic fortunes, it would be another diplomatic victory for the regime, one that manipulates Western interests to limit consequences of its poor domestic track record. In June, the government confirmed support from the U.N. system for “reconstruction and development” in the Anglophone regions even as the war rages on.

The regime is increasingly confident that loans, grants, investment, and humanitarian assistance will keep rolling in no matter what it does, so instead of trying to improve the economy or end the war, it continues to import military hardware and expand its already bloated and fragmented security forces.

Cameroon is thus looking more like Sudan every day as insecurity and economic stagnation resulting from poor governance is ignored by external actors. Besides growing criminal insecurity in its major cities, killings of journalists, and a spreading cholera crisis, the country faces nearly interminable conflict along its periphery, in what was formerly the British Southern Cameroons (the two Anglophone regions), the British Northern Cameroons (where Boko Haram and its successors continue to threaten villages and farms), and along the border with perennially unstable Central African Republic.

Labelling all insecurity as simply “terrorism” for an international audience, Cameroon convinces many countries to keep selling it arms, vehicles, and aircraft. The impending succession crisis after more than 40 years under Biya will thus take place in a weakly institutionalized political system where the ability and propensity to employ violence has increased dramatically. Sudan offers a stark warning of the possible consequences.

While Sudanese and outside stakeholders rejoiced over longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir’s removal from office in April 2019, the transitional government was in place just long enough for Sudan to reach the first stage of its long-delayed acceptance into the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. In June 2021, the IMF and World Bank boards approved initial debt relief for Sudan, dropping the accumulated $56 billion debt to $28 billion. At that point, Sudan was on track for its own Extended Credit Facility and, later, to even further debt relief under HIPC.

But the October 2021 coup, and now the outright destruction of the country by two rival generals since April 2023, reversed those limited gains. Arms exports to and joint ventures within Sudan (including with Russia’s Wagner Group) ensured both sides were well-equipped even as the economy suffered a decadelong slide. War usually fought on the periphery has now reached most cities and regions across the country. So, besides the enormous human toll, private capital formation and public infrastructure are being destroyed at a rapid rate from Khartoum to West Darfur. The volunteer, neighborhood resistance committees once crucial to the transition in 2019 but subsequently sidelined now scramble to fill the gaps of a collapsing state.

The development in Sudan of two separate military institutions—the regular armed forces and the institutionalization of the irregular Janjaweed militia as the Rapid Support Forces in the mid-2010s—ultimately did not fulfill at least one key objective of Bashir’s regime: It did not coup-proof his regime by building up two countervailing forces. Those rival military organizations are now tearing the country apart.

Cameroon has followed a similar process of expansion and bifurcation of security services over the past two decades, and the resulting situation creates the potential for confrontation once Biya, now 90, becomes incapacitated. There is a constitutional process of succession, triggering a presidential election within months, but few expect the ruling party factions to rally behind any one candidate. (Biya may yet hang on and run in the 2025 election at age 92, or pass off his baton to his son Franck). A real concern is that different ruling party factions have influence over different branches of the fragmented security forces.

The Presidential Guard protects the President and key government installations The regular armed forces have a traditional three-branch (army, navy, air force) structure, and contribute to a regular peacekeeping rotation in the Central African Republic, but the regular army is the least well-equipped compared to the Presidential Guard and the Bataillon d’Intervention Rapide (BIR), a separate branch established in 2001 under Israeli military advisors. The BIR has since expanded to a number of individual battalions as well as its own air and maritime components, and is permanently engaged in combat operations against both Boko Haram and Anglophone armed groups.

While both the Presidential Guard and the BIR are controlled directly by the presidency, they report up different factional chains of command and keep a close eye on each other.

Besides the expansion and fragmentation of the security forces, since 2020, new armored vehicle imports have been identified from Canada, France, and mostly from the United Arab Emirates. At least two used Bell 412EP helicopters (built in North America and powered by Pratt & Whitney Canada engines) were procured since 2019, joining others already in service. Four new Italian-built Leonardo AW109E helicopters have been delivered more recently; they were photographed flying in a May 20 military parade and elsewhere in Cameroon after being held up in Italy since 2018 due to either lack of money or export permits, or both.

And this new equipment is on the top of the significant military assistance from China, France, Israel, Serbia, South Africa, and the United States between 2014-2018 to help in the struggle against Boko Haram. Many of those aircraft, vehicles, and helicopter assets have since been deployed to the Anglophone areas, including U.S. surveillance aircraft, Chinese tank destroyers, and the more recent Italian helicopters.

In short, there is no incentive for the Cameroonian government to agree to substantive peace negotiations, better economic management, or political reforms. The various political factions are solely focused on jockeying for power in preparation of the post-Biya era. There are simply no consequences to Biya and ruling-party factions under him for continuing the war (and considerable evidence that many benefit from its continuation): There is no effective elected opposition, there are few restrictions on military imports, international financing continues from all sources, there is no pressure coming from neighbors or other African leaders or organizations to negotiate, and the West keeps sending mixed signals about whether it takes peace and conflict resolution seriously.

Like the military leaders in Sudan who now fight for power without constraint, the factions looking at a post-Biya Cameroon have not faced any consequences for stalling either peace talks or real political (or economic) reform.

The moment Biya loses his grip on power through incapacitation or death, it is possible that similar struggles could break out within the ruling party, with factions leveraging different elements of the security services to back their claims.

The United States, Canada, Norway, the European Union, and key international institutions need to send consistent signals in support of peace, justice, and democracy, rather than call for peace but support the brittle status quo. What peace and justice ultimately look like can only be determined by Cameroonians, but that process requires more openings for potential reformers willing to talk and more restraints on hard-liners before Cameroon advances any further down the road to Khartoum.

Culled from Foreign Policy

The begging-bowl disorder which has engulfed the Cameroon community in the Diaspora is now a pandemic which requires urgent attention with a view to eradicating it.

This disease is always visible when someone dies, and the family creates a WhatsApp forum to beg and pester friends and acquaintances for resources to celebrate the late person’s life.

This week in the United Kingdom, it is the turn to do the honours for the fallen hero of Anglophone Cameroon, Chairman Ni John Fru Ndi who sadly passed away at his residence in Yaoundé on Monday the 12 June 2023.

Chairman John Fru Ndi founded the Social Democratic Party in Cameroon in 1990 and has been widely credited with the advent of multi-party politics in Cameroon.

However, for the last twenty-five years, the Chairman has formed a profitable political business with the CPDM regime. His scandalous association with Paul Biya has earned him over US$12.5 million in the process and made him a very rich man.

Why then are his children and family in the UK about to engage in the laborious activity of petitioning for funds in his name?

Habit and Greed, I guess!

John Fru Ndi’s family is demonstrating the same traits he possessed. He was selfish, self-centered, stingy and devoid of emotions.

The actions of his children and family in England are consistent with the personality of the fallen man. So, over the next few weeks, security officers, health-care assistants, nurses, container loaders and the unemployed within the Cameroon community in England will be harassed and shamed to make contributions to celebrate the life of a man who earned more than US$12.5 million from politics and possesses a few foreign bank accounts where some of his stolen treasure and loot are hidden.

This publication has gathered that some friends have advised the family in the UK not to engage in this public begging disgrace but like the Chairman, his children were not persuaded by such genuine attempts to make them see sense in their looming foolishness. Dignity, a rare currency, is not what they possess and care about.

Self-awareness is evidently not this family’s forte, and it is no surprise that a WhatsApp forum has now been set up to achieve their questionable and disgraceful aims.

Money is needed to bury the dead, but to go about it by compelling the poor to pay for the celebration of the life of a rich man like John Fru Ndi is plain wrong and despicable.

As the apple never falls far from the tree, the descendants are doing what they inherited from their master—financial greed!

It may be normal for the families of people with humble and modest bank balances to seek community support after they die, but there is nothing normal for a very rich man’s family to do so.

Fru Ndi’s family is not poor financially, but it is poor mentally. Their mental poverty is robbing them of the dignity they are supposed to have given their late father’s political status in Cameroon.

In a descent society, a man of Fru Ndi’s status should be given a state burial, making it possible for the poor to have a break.

But Cameroon’s poor, many of whom have fled poverty and are hiding in England, will not know any respite as Mr. Fru Ndi’s family engages in a humiliating game of overt begging and desperation.

Fru Ndi, a man who triggered a wave of hope and optimism in the early 90s when he challenged Paul Biya, Cameroon’s current and sit-tight president, has quit the political stage with very negative ratings due to his incestuous relationship with the ruling party.

He will however be remembered for the courage and charisma he demonstrated in the 90s. May his soul rest in peace!

By Soter Tarh Agbaw-Ebai

Chairman and Editor-In-Chief

In September 2015, Bertrand Bucuka, a staff sergeant serving in the Cameroon special forces, gathered his military gear and changed into civilian clothes. From there, he traveled by bus for the next three days — heading to the nearest airport.

Bucuka served as a staff sergeant in the Cameroon Special Forces.

“I knew that if I were caught, I would spend the rest of my life in jail or be killed,” Bucuka said.

When he first enlisted in the Cameroon Armed Forces in 2009, Bucuka decided to pursue the military with the intention of serving his country. In his seven years of service, Bucuka worked several roles including infantry, communications and as an explosive ordnance disposal instructor.

Being from an English-speaking region of Cameroon, Bucuka also worked as an English and French translator and worked with U.S. military personnel.

In this position, his commanding officers would often ask him to spy on the American troops. Feeling that their request was unethical, Bucuka said he refused to obey those orders and added that building a trusting relationship in the field of EOD is critical.

“In the field of explosives, the first mistake is always the last,” Bucuka said.

In another instance, Bucuka’s leadership once again tested his ethics when he was ordered to execute an unarmed, injured man in Nigeria. Instead, he decided to seek help from a U.S. combat medic to help him save the man’s life.

“At the time, I knew that my decision to save one life might have cost me mine,” he said.

As Bucuka continued to deal with difficult decisions, and faced growing scrutiny from his commanding officers, he knew his life was at risk.

“It was time to either leave the country or stay in the military and die,” Bucuka said.

During his travels from Cameroon, Bucuka faced a number of challenges including being denied entry in Ecuador. With help from a stranger he met along his travels, Bucuka gained assistance from the United Nations Human Rights Council, eventually gaining entry in Peru.

He would go on to travel for the next six months — through South America and Central America. In that time, he endured life-threatening situations as he attempted to cross borders, sometimes with the help of smugglers.

In some countries, he was arrested and detained at the border but was later released after explaining his story.

In February 2017, Bucuka arrived at the United States-Mexico border, near San Diego. He explained his situation to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers, and then worked with the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI to verify his case.

“[How I made it] is beyond human reason,” Bucuka said. “I just knew there was no turning back for me.”

Following a two-month investigation, the officers released Bucuka and allowed him entry into the U.S. In 2018, the U.S. officially granted Bucuka asylum.

Now, he finds himself wearing another military uniform — this time for the United States Air Force.

For Bucuka, joining the Air Force was a way for him to thank everyone who helped him when he arrived in the United States, including a number of U.S. military members that he worked with in Africa.

“The only way I could show my gratitude to [those] who stood by me was by serving the flag of this nation,” Bucuka said. “I had no family, no relatives and they remembered what I did for them in Africa and came to my rescue here.”

Today, Airman 1st Class Bucuka, is an enlisted aerospace medical service specialist assigned to the 1st Special Operations Medical Group at Hurlburt Field. Bucuka works with doctors and helps to provide care to patients at the base medical clinic.

Compared to his previous experiences in the Cameroon military, Bucuka says he never expected that someday he could end up working in a hospital setting.

“All I knew from my past experiences was being on the battlefield, but today, I find myself working in the same place every day,” he said.

Along with serving his role in aerospace medical services, Bucuka also finds himself drawing from his past military experience in Africa.

As an Airman assigned to Air Force Special Operations Command, Bucuka often gets the opportunity to conduct briefings with special operations forces across a variety of career fields.

“The main objective is to share my experience and what the U.S. can do to better strengthen their relationship with Africa,” Bucuka said. “And it’s actually helped them carry out their mission successfully when they have deployed.”

Beyond the military, Bucuka hopes to always find an opportunity to serve others and mentioned he wants to use his new-found medical skills to support humanitarian efforts.

Additionally, he says his future is now focused on his family, including his children who have joined him in Florida.

No matter what, Bucuka knows that his journey changed his life forever and has ultimately changed his outlook on life.

“I realize now that what is meant to be, will be, no matter what,” Bucuka said. “That’s how I live my life now.”

Culled from af.mil/news

Abductions are a new fundraising method used by separatists, analysts say. More than 30 women were taken last week for “allowing themselves to be manipulated by Cameroon’s government,” according to the insurgents.

The latest abduction of over 30 women by separatists has caused uproar across Cameroon.

According to reports, they were forcibly taken from the village of Big Babanki, located about 25 kilometers (15 miles) west of Bamenda in the northwest of the country. Some were said to have been “severely tortured.”

The separatist gangs responsible for these kinds of abductions are all part of a moblike structure running the region, where insurgents are waging attacks against the government: They impose illegal taxes on locals, which they collect monthly from women, men and even children.

They also demand taxes from unmarried couples, and even force families to pay the equivalent of about €1,000 ($1,070) to bury their deceased relatives.

But dissent against the dissidents is growing: Ordinary citizens and civil society groups in Cameroon have expressed anger over the arbitrary way that separatists choose to run the region.

When residents refuse to be silenced, their leaders opt for violence, as was the case with the latest abductions: The women had reportedly refused to pay the illegal taxes imposed by the separatists and rejected a curfew imposed on them.

During the attack on the villagers, several of the women were reportedly injured; there were reports of violence and torture against them. Relatives of those who were abducted said they were anxious about their return.

Silencing women activists – for a reason

Ngongba Assumpta Lum, the founder of the Centre for Advocacy in Gender Equality and Action for Development, told DW that the kidnappings were deliberately aimed at trying to silence women in particular, as they are the ones who usually play a crucial role in crisis resolution in traditional and tribal societies in Cameroon.

“The kidnapping of these women in Babanki is a serious blow to us as civil society actors, especially as women-led organizations, peace advocates and organizations fighting for peace to return to the regions,” she said, adding that she feared that this surge in abductions over the past five years would yet get worse.

“I think as mothers, we are greatly touched because this situation is going overboard,” Lum added.

No trust in the government

Cameroon’s government said on Wednesday that a special military operation to rescue the women was underway. However, locals aren’t confident of a success, as it is the same government that these separatists are fighting.

Some of them had said the women were abducted for “allowing themselves to be manipulated by Cameroon’s government.”

But Sally Mbumien, a community leader in Bamenda, believes the actions of the fighters are an attempt to erode the power of women in Cameroon: “Not only is this politicizing our traditional institutions of women’s power, it is also an insult to womanhood, to motherhood and also it sets the wrong precedence,” he told DW, adding that this was “the worst thing that can happen.”

Yvonne Muma, a resident of Bamenda, said she felt angered by the kidnappings, telling DW that the abduction was tantamount to a sacrilege: “These boys have just raised the wrath of God by touching our mothers. They will have no peace until they confess,” Muma said.

Kidnappings: a new way of financing separatism

Cameroon has been plagued by fighting since English-speaking separatists launched a rebellion against the government in 2017. The dissidents say they want the region to secede from the area dominated by the French-speaking majority, and creating an independent, English-speaking state.

But the conflict has claimed more than 6,000 lives to date and has forced more than 1 million people to flee their homes.

With insurgents running out of funds to continue with their campaign — even despite collecting illegal taxes — analysts believe that resorting to abductions appears to be an attractive way to finance their operations.

“Now we have cases of mass kidnappings. Initially, there would be one or two individuals being kidnapped and ransom being asked,” human rights lawyer Agbor Balla told DW, adding that the number of abductions is skyrocketing.

According to Balla, tighter government controls on money laundering and the flow of illicitly obtained money have crippled the activities of the separatists.

“As government tightens financial flows, separatist leaders and sympathizers abroad … it becomes difficult to get the necessary financial support to fund” their activities, he said, adding that endeavors in certain Western countries in the fight against terrorism and its funding had also helped bleed the pockets of separatists dry.

Few rogue elements ‘abducting’ anglophone cause

Meanwhile, the concerns expressed by such separatist groups are regarded as valid: They allege that Anglophone speakers suffer political marginalization in Cameroon and lack the recognition of their cultural identity.

However, the more violent their methods become, the less sympathy they are likely to garner from outside observers — and perhaps also from their own people, even if these kidnappings and other violent acts are only carried out by a few rogue figures in their midst.

Balla said their campaign against the government is also plagued by infighting and fragmentation, making it difficult for separatists to show an organized, united front, which he argues is exactly what allows fringe elements to resort to kidnapping and abusing civilians.

“Because there is no central command and control, most of the leaders of the fighters on the ground are just made of a few persons or groups, and they need to fund their own struggles in their own communities,” he said.

With citizens in the separatist-held regions losing faith in the leadership of the fighters and refusing to pay their bogus taxes that help fund their operations, analysts like Balla fear the number of abductions could surge drastically in the coming months.

Culled from DW

The recent announcement by the attention-seeking Fai Yengo Francis that 18 Ambazonia fighters have surrender to Cameroon government forces not only failed to advance the sinister goals of the Biya French Cameroun regime in Yaoundé but laid bare deep divisions and dissensions in the entire Biya cabinet.

It was evident when Etoudi ordered the arrest of its spy chief Léopold Maxime Eko Eko over the Martinez Zogo affair prompting some of Eko Eko’s acolytes to abruptly abandoned the Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh’s camp.

Unfortunately, anti Southern Cameroons work within the Minister Ngoh Ngoh camp is not progressing well due to much pressure from very inexperienced cabinet ministers trying to impose their views on military affairs.

Mindful of the numerous unannounced and unceremonious departures from the Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh camp, disputes within this so-called “Chantal Biya Men” have reached worrying levels. Threatening messages and death threats are being exchanged between different factions deep within the Biya cabinet.

Harassment has not been limited to individuals around the 90-year-old President Biya. Those already detained at the Kondengui Maximum Security Prison in Yaoundé are also receiving threats if they dare make any startling revelations.   Ngoh Ngoh is reportedly the principal architect behind the threats and many within the security apparatus of the state have hinted this reporter that the Ngoh Ngoh’s primitive and cheap design is simply to gain notoriety.

It is precisely this battle to succeed President Biya within the French backed Biya Francophone Beti Ewondo regime that would justify Governor Fai Yengo Francis recent anti Southern Cameroons announcement. Unity among the Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh gang has not been possible mainly because his supporters have attacked other members of the Biya entourage, stating that Ngoh Ngoh should be recognized as the only possible Biya replacement given his special relationship with the Biya family.

Political analysts opine that another internal CPDM conflict that has erected a stone wall against the Southern Cameroons peace process is the confrontation between some Francophone nationalists headed by Ngoh Ngoh and the pro decentralization plans promoted by the former spy chief Léopold Maxime Eko Eko.

It seems there are several political visions within what is being dubbed as the race to succeed President Biya.  It is true we can find notable differences in the political views of members, but at the level of discourse, we find ourselves within the Francofools family resemblance idea. That is, despite serious differences, they all fall under the same political discourse. Agreements and disagreements within that diverse Beti Ewondo group are expressed in the same language, that of Francofools.

All members of the so-called Vice President Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh group view themselves through what many in Southern Cameroons called the “Francophone supremacists”. Similarly, all members of this Ngoh Ngoh group paint others like Eko Eko clamoring for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Southern Cameroons as black legs. The Ngoh Ngoh doctrine simplifies Cameroon into good and bad: Beti Ewondo political dominance and Anglophone barbarism. Minister Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh’s doctrine is presently being observed in all departments of government despite numerous and violent differences among its various members.

Despite glaring differences, all these stances can be understood within the same Francophone political discourse, whose goal is to destroy everything Anglo-Saxon and replace it with some new Made In Yaoundé political structure in which Southern Cameroons will no longer have political relevance.

By Soter Tarh Agbaw-Ebai

Cameroon’s economic growth was revised down to 3.4% for 2022, reflecting the impact of the security crises in the Anglophone regions and the Far North, inflationary pressure, global supply chain disruptions and tight financial conditions. In 2023, GDP growth is expected to recover somewhat to 4.3%, mainly driven by LNG and mining production.

Impact

Cameroon is the largest economy in the CEMAC (Central African Economic and Monetary Union) and is relatively well diversified compared to the other oil-reliant member states. Nevertheless, the country is highly dependent on commodity exports (oil, gas, mining and agriculture), making it vulnerable to external shocks and price volatility. Further economic diversification is essential, knowing that Cameroon’s existing oil fields are maturing and the decline in oil production is set to continue. Insecurity and an ongoing conflict since 2017 have deterred the development of new fields as Cameroon’s oil riches are mostly located in the Anglophone regions.

The country’s 2022 external balances benefitted from high international commodity prices following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Despite higher inflation and import prices, Cameroon’s terms of trade improved. The current account deficit has moderated and is expected to stabilise at around a manageable 3% of GDP as of 2023. However, a funding squeeze – resulting from global risk aversion and high domestic and international borrowing costs – has been lowering capital inflows. Consequently, small financing gaps could emerge on the external balance of payments. Thanks to the improved terms of trade, Cameroon’s foreign exchange reserves have recovered to pre-Covid levels of around five months of import cover. In fact, Cameroon is the largest contributor to the reserves of the CEMAC, a monetary union consisting mainly of oil-exporting countries where liquidity levels still tend to follow the evolution of hydrocarbon revenues. 

Cameroon participates in a three-year IMF Extended Credit Facility programme since July 2021, to help deal with the immediate financial consequences of the Covid-19 crisis and the country’s weak public payment behaviour. Although structural reforms are lacking and the general fiscal performance is mixed, the IMF programme remains on track. Assuming fiscal reforms will be strictly implemented, the public debt stock is expected to come down to 43% of GDP by the end of 2023, after having grown steadily over the past decade to 47% and 46% of GDP in 2021 and 2022 respectively. Despite the acceptable public debt stock level, the government’s finances have been under serious stress and the difficult liquidity position of the state – especially due to dysfunctional state-owned enterprises (SOEs) – have led to substantial domestic and external payment arrears over the past few years. The over-indebtedness of public oil company SONARA and the bad payment morality of other SOEs have seriously damaged the country’s financial reputation. Moreover, the IMF classifies Cameroon at ‘high risk of debt distress’, although it considers the country’s public debt to be ‘sustainable’, meaning a default is not anticipated. Rising LNG production and growing mining output will help Cameroon’s fiscal revenue collection in the near term, even though oil output will continue to decline.

Despite substantial domestic food production and the BEAC’s (a regional central bank, serving the CEMAC member states) tighter monetary policies, inflation in Cameroon still reached 6% in 2022 and is expected to remain at 5.7% in 2023. The rising cost of living is mainly driven by food inflation caused by unfavourable domestic weather conditions, security issues and high import prices. Together with shortages of fertilisers, high food prices do not only drive up inflation, they also raise the risk for food insecurity.

Credendo’s MLT political risk classification for Cameroon was downgraded from 5/7 to 6/7 in May 2020 during the Covid-19 crisis and has remained stable ever since. The separatist violence in the Anglophone regions and the insecurity related to Boko Haram in the Far North pose important downside risks. Another risk stems from the political scene that is dominated by 90-year-old President Paul Biya, who won a seventh term in 2018 during a flawed election and is rumoured to be in poor health. It is highly uncertain what will happen if and when Paul Biya becomes unable to rule, but that situation would entail a serious risk of political destabilisation.

Culled from Credendo