23, September 2018
Cameroon’s first ‘social media election’ 0
Activity on Cameroon’s social media space has intensified ahead of the October elections as users share footage of abuses and politicians tweet their every move in a bid to engage voters.
Nine candidates are contesting the October 7 poll, including President Paul Biya, who has ruled the country for 35 years and is hoping to be re-elected for a sixth time.
But this time, the 85-year-old broke with media tradition by announcing his candidacy on Twitter, a key indicator that social media is taking a central role in this year’s presidential election.
There is much greater potential in terms of reach than when their words are communicated through the written press or the radio.
‘Breaking with protocol’
During the last election in 2011, only a handful of candidates were using social media. Today, almost all of them have a dedicated team to ensure they are very much present online.
One of Biya’s main challengers is Joshua Osih, head of the opposition Social Democratic Front (SDF), who has taken to engaging with voters online.
When he came under fire for “unpresidential behaviour” after posting a picture of himself at the airport in Paris, he hit back immediately on Twitter, saying that was exactly the point.
“I want to break with protocol and everything to do with the myth around the presidency,” he wrote. “I want to be close to the people I rule and not shut up in a palace.”
Why social media?
For candidates, going online offers far greater exposure than traditional forms of campaigning, explains Julie Owono, executive director of Internet Without Borders, an NGO.
“There is much greater potential in terms of reach than when their words are communicated through the written press or the radio,” she said.
For Owono, this increased presence online is the result of a significantly higher rate of internet connectivity in Cameroon.
Figures released earlier this month by the ministry of postal and telecoms services show connectivity jumped from a mere 0.24 percent of the population in 2011 to 35 percent last year. “There has been a fall in the cost of internet access and network quality has also improved,” she said.
Risk of fake news?
Although the official launch of the election campaign is only due to start on Saturday, social media is already highlighting prominent topics, especially the security crisis in Cameroon’s English-speaking regions.
Blighted by armed conflict, the two regions have remained largely inaccessible to the media and NGOs but those involved in the fighting have used social media to expose purported human rights violations by the other side.
Since the conflict began at the end of 2017, footage of alleged abuses involving both anglophone separatists and Cameroonian soldiers have been doing the rounds almost every day on social media.
A military policeman with his head cut off, villages burnt by the army, and even scenes of torture: all these excesses caught on camera are used by both sides to try and discredit the enemy.
Faced with the surge of horrific footage spreading online, the government has called for calm, denouncing the “inappropriate use of the internet”.
Both the increase in hate speech and the proliferation of “fake news” are proving to be “a threat to our right to reliable information, above all in an election period,” said Communications Minister Tchiroma Bakary.
In July, the minister dismissed out of hand a video purportedly showing abuse by Cameroonian soldiers in the country’s Far North Region, where troops are deployed to root out Boko Haram jihadists.
Several weeks later, an investigation was opened and several soldiers were arrested. “The main challenge regarding the use of social networks is disinformation,” said Janvier Ngnoulaye, who heads an NGO called Internet Society Cameroon.
Will gov’t shutdown social media?
With less than three weeks until the vote, Biya’s supporters, who see him as best placed to handle the separatist crisis and the threat posed by Boko Haram, maintain that footage of alleged abuses by the army was put online in order to sabotage his re-election bid.
“It’s all about harming Biya’s image,” a security source told AFP. In fact, the campaign has sparked an online war of images: when one side posts pictures of roads in disrepair, the other responds with photos of huge construction projects, such as the motorway between Yaounde and Douala.
Earlier this month, a misleading rumour began circulating on social networks suggesting that Yaounde was going to shut down internet access during the vote, as happened in Mali in August.
“Fake news,” responded the communications minister. But such fears are not entirely unfounded. In early 2017, as the separatist protests multiplied in Cameroon’s English-speaking regions, Yaounde sought to stamp out the unrest by cutting off internet access in the two areas for over three months.
AFP
24, September 2018
Understanding Southern Cameroons vicious war of secession 0
A vicious war of secession has ravaged the two Anglophone regions of Cameroon since January 2018. Non-state militias warring with the government aim to create an independent Ambazonian state. While central Africa has seen its share of wars of secession (the majority of which culminate in an agreement between the parties), aspects of Cameroon’s secessionists distinguish them, and this war, from others.
To refer to the group in public by the wrong name amidst the wrong strangers could invite a beating or even one’s murder. Therefore, in public civilians refer to secessionists as the Amba, or the Amba Boys. Privately, those who support the secessionists refer to them as freedom fighters, restoration forces, or, the army. Those who oppose them refer to them as the boys, the Ambazonians, and the terrorists.
But Anglophone Cameroonians overwhelmingly view secessionists positively. This is so even when they object to their tactics. For instance, secessionists call for Ghost Towns, or city-wide strikes every Monday. They call, too, for boycotting all primary and secondary schools. A secondary school teacher in the Southwest Anglophone capital region of Buea noted, “I don’t agree with preventing children from going to school, but I support the secessionists’ aims. Therefore, I tolerate it.” Others, like this 35-year-old entrepreneur in Buea, say, “I completely support all actions the freedom fighters take, and I am honored to keep my daughter from school. Students are just pawns of the Cameroonian president.” When asked whether targeting children and teachers was legitimate he added, “Yes, they are supporting the Biya regime.”
This perspective is not limited to the Anglophone regions. Anglophones in Francophone Cameroon like this cab driver in the country’s largest city, Douala, say, “Francophone Cameroonians do not understand the Anglophones’ plight. They assume everything the freedom fighters do is bad. They never listen to us, and cannot be trusted, so, independence is our only option.”
During the first few months of the conflict, the secessionists generally targeted only those who disobeyed their orders, or who they suspected had government affiliations. This has changed drastically in recent months. In villages and cities spanning both Anglophone regions, the secessionists extort, kidnap, and rape civilians. Public opinion seems increasingly impervious to such offenses. The secessionists lack a central command, and so when rape or extortion occurs people are quick to pin it on imposters, not the real secessionists.
Such deflections are not entirely without merit. There are more than 20 secessionist groups fighting in the two Anglophone regions at the time of this writing in September of 2018. The majority of these arose during the summer, correlating directly with the violence spike against civilians. Additionally, the so-called interim Ambazonian government has condemned all attacks and denied all responsibility. Such refutations are near impossible to verify given the informal secessionist structure which often as not is controlled from outside Cameroon.
Interestingly, purported, legitimate secessionists have punished others for abusing civilians. In August, secessionist leaders in Buea apprehended, publicly beat, and disposed of four people. The four were extorting locals supposedly on behalf of the secessionists. At the same time, however, individuals claiming separatist affiliations continue extorting civilians without punishment.
Which brings us to this tale’s central oddity: Anglophone Cameroonians attribute magical powers, or juju, to those who they believe to be legitimate secessionist fighters. They believe secessionist fighters adhere to strict codes of conduct that abhor rape, murder, and extortion. They believe in return for abiding by these rules the secessionists can shapeshift and are impervious to bullets and knives. The Cameroonian military has repeatedly turned its weapons over to secessionist fighters without a fight. Secessionist fighter deaths fail to dispel the illusion. They are proof that the fighters broke the conduct code or were illegitimate secessionists in the first place. As Cameroon’s crisis worsens, understanding the socio-cultural underpinnings of the conflict remains critical.
Source: Modern Ghana