After twenty months of clashes, the government and the separatists are both refusing to give ground. Both sides must explore compromise solutions aimed at a level of regional autonomy somewhere between the secession the separatists yearn for and the fake decentralisation proposed by Yaoundé.

What’s new? The conflict in the Anglophone regions of Cameroon is deadlocked. There is no dialogue between Yaoundé and the separatists, who are both refusing to give ground: the government is counting on a military victory and refuses to discuss the form of the state; the separatists demand independence.

Why does it matter? In the last 20 months, the conflict has left 1,850 dead, 530,000 internally displaced and tens of thousands of refugees. The intransigence of the belligerents threatens to generate further violence and prolong the conflict, which neither can win in the short term.

What should be done? Cameroonian and international actors should encourage the two sides to make concessions by threatening to sanction those who stand in the way of dialogue and rewarding the less intransigent. Ending the conflict will eventually require changes in the legal framework for decentralisation to grant greater autonomy to communes and regions.

Executive Summary

Cameroon’s Anglophone crisis is deadlocked. Twenty months of clashes have killed 1,850, displaced 530,000 and led tens of thousands to seek refuge abroad, but the government and the separatists are sticking to their irreconcilable positions. The separatists continue to dream that independence is just around the corner. In Yaoundé, the government still wrongly believes it can win a quick military victory. Meanwhile, moderates and federalists, who enjoy majority support, are unable to organise. To break the deadlock, Cameroonian and international actors should put pressure on the government and the separatists. Both sides must explore compromise solutions aimed at a level of regional autonomy somewhere between the secession desired by the separatists and the fake decentralisation proposed by Yaoundé.

The socio-political crisis that began in October 2016 in the Anglophone Northwest and Southwest regions mutated into armed conflict at the end of 2017. Seven armed militias are currently in positions of strength in most rural areas. The security forces reacted slowly, but since mid-2018 have inflicted casualties on the separatists. They have not been able, however, to regain full control over rural areas nor prevent repeated separatist attacks in the towns.

There is currently no dialogue between Yaoundé and the separatists. The latter are calling for talks to hammer out the practical details of independence in the presence of an international mediator. The government refuses to discuss the form of the state or reform of institutions. It proposes instead a decentralisation model that grants neither adequate funding nor sufficient powers to local authorities (communes and regions) and intends to organise the country’s first regional elections later this year. Far from resolving the conflict, this half-baked proposal risks provoking further violence.

Local initiatives to promote dialogue are emerging. In July 2018, Anglophone religious leaders (Catholic, Protestant and Muslim) announced a plan to hold an Anglophone General Conference as a first step toward an inclusive national dialogue. A majority of Anglophones are in favour of this initiative. Initially reluctant, some separatists now seem to be more open to the idea on condition that it prepares the way for a referendum on self-determination that would give the choice between federalism and independence. Faced with opposition from the government, the conference organisers have already had to postpone it twice: from August to November 2018 and then to March 2019. It still has not taken place.

Although some separatists will refuse to give ground, others might accept a dialogue with the Cameroonian authorities, in the presence of an international mediator, to discuss federalism or genuine decentralisation that would grant autonomy and adequate funding to the regions and that would guarantee respect for the specific features of the Anglophone judicial and education systems. Similarly, although the Cameroonian government seems to rule out federalism, it might consent to regionalism or genuine decentralisation, which would involve changes to the legislative framework.

To clear the path to talks, the belligerents must each make concessions in order to establish a minimum degree of trust and reverse the spiral of violence. The government should support an Anglophone General Conference in order for Anglophones to appoint representatives to a national dialogue while at the same time providing non-separatist Anglophones with the opportunity to express their point of view. Cameroon’s president should adopt a conciliatory stance and recognise the existence of the Anglophone problem and the legitimacy of the Anglophones’ demands; order investigations into abuses by the security forces; make provision for reparations to victims and the reconstruction of affected areas; and release the hundreds of Anglophone activists currently in detention, including important members of the separatist movement. The separatists should renounce their strategy of Monday “ghost towns” (general strikes) and their school boycott and expel combatants guilty of abuses against civilians.

A combination of internal and international pressures could lead both the government and the separatists to make such concessions. International actors could reward the parties who agree to moderate their positions and sanction those who remain intransigent. The Europeans and Americans, in particular, should consider targeted sanctions against government leaders and senior army officers who continue to obstruct dialogue (travel bans, asset freeze) and separatists who encourage or organise violence (judicial proceedings). The International Criminal Court prosecutor should open preliminary examinations into abuses committed by both sides, to underline that the pursuit of violence will have judicial consequences. International actors are divided, however, on what position to adopt and what measures to take and should first reach a common position, at least among Western countries.

Internally, Cameroonian Francophones and Anglophones who advocate compromise should mobilise to put pressure on the separatists and the government. In particular, federalists should work together to strengthen their position in the talks. They should continue to dialogue with the separatists and encourage them to moderate their positions, and increase the pressure on the authorities to open up to the less intransigent separatists. Finally, they should conduct an international campaign to promote peaceful solutions.

Once trust has been established, preliminary talks between government, federalist and separatist representatives will be necessary. These should take place outside the country. During this process, international actors, especially the U.S., Switzerland, the Vatican, the UN, the EU (especially France, Germany and the UK) and the African Union (AU) should continue to encourage the government to dialogue and offer funding and support for the talks.

In the event of a dialogue taking place, they could also help to fund compensation payments to victims of abuses, the reconstruction of Anglophone regions, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons and the disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants. Given the level of acrimony between the parties, the presence of an international mediator will be necessary during the preparatory discussions and then during the national dialogue. Several countries and international institutions and organisations have offered to mediate since the start of the conflict. The UN, the AU, the Catholic Church and Switzerland seem best placed to play this role, because the parties to the conflict perceive them as relatively neutral.

Substantive talks between the three parties should take place in Cameroon, which would require the government to guarantee safe passage for separatist representatives. During these talks, the government should indicate its readiness to amend the Constitution in order to grant greater autonomy to the regions and develop the legal framework for decentralisation. This could include direct elections for the regional councils and these councils’ presidents; the establishment of regional structures with substantial financial and administrative power; and an increase in the powers and resources allocated to communes. The government could also reform institutions and governance in order to take account of the specific features of the educational and judicial systems in the Anglophone regions.

More broadly, the conflict highlights the shortcomings of Cameroon’s centralised governance model and raises two crucial issues that the government must address: the need to improve the way the state handles minority rights, colonial heritages and cultural specificities; and the need for a fairer and more equitable redistribution of the country’s wealth. A lasting solution to the conflict requires dialogue and consensus, which are indispensable to undertake the institutional and governance reforms that Cameroon needs.

Source: International Crisis Group

Ambazonia Acting President Samuel Ikome Sako ’s forthcoming Cabinet shakeup has been described as a “CPDM Coup” meant to stifle the Southern Cameroons revolution and prepare him for a takeover from Sisiku Ayuk Tabe by axing those opposed to his failed leadership.

The Southern Cameroons European bloc says that instead of a Cabinet reshuffle, the disgraced Ambazonia leader should just step aside and save the Southern Cameroons resistance and quest for independence.  Southern Cameroons leaders in France, Belgium, Holland, the UK and Germany have unanimously opined that the Sako reshuffle is a joke that isn’t funny.

While prominent Southern Cameroons voices have called for calm observing that for our struggle to succeed, we must be committed to the principle, which is the Southern Cameroons and not individuals. And that much time was needed for the governing IG structures to correct discernible errors based on forensic evidence, Cameroon Concord News Group can now reveal that Dr Samuel Ikome Sako is no longer the man to lead us to Buea.

The general opinion is that Sako is simply the biggest stumbling block to the Ambazonia revolution. To be sure, the Ambazonian Interim Government under Sako is pack with lazy, corrupt and incompetent people. It is abundantly clear that Sako’s reshuffle is meant to crush those opposed to him and Irene Ngwa and has nothing to do with the performance but more to do with factional wars in the Interim Government.

This shudder and cockiness is reverberating around the whole nation. Cameroon Concord News Group is trying to make sense of this absurdity. The fact that Sako hasn’t got the decency or respect to consult the pillars of the struggle some of whom are in Kondengui speaks volumes of his intent. This looks like a coup. Come to think of it, it is a coup. He has arrived. He has made himself President by Executive Order.

We now understand that the jailed leaders in Kondengui were reportedly informed of the so-called reshuffle by a third party.  This utter disregard for the institution and structure of government must be condemned in the strongest terms. The question now is if the Restoration Council can have a pair of brass balls to block this madness. If Chairman Kometa and his team don’t block this psychosis, they will be confined to the dustbin of Ambazonia history and every indictment that comes their way will be deserved.

This so-called new cabinet is a Chris Anu-Irene Ngwa affair!! And it is intended to hide the truth that Sako and his gang misappropriated the proceeds of MTTB. He then hired a friend of his to prepare an audit report. No cabinet reshuffle will mend this. The buck stops with the leader. No amount of cover-up will make this go away. Southern Cameroonians have elected to vote with their wallets. The IG as we speak has no finances.  The LGAs are in charge and no competent and rightful thinking County head will authorize payment to this clowns.

In his new cabinet, Acting Interim President is expected to appoint Presidential Security and a Webmaster. IG sources have hinted that Professor Martin Ayim has moved from a nurse to a PhD in Physical Education and has just been made Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Prof Ayim is Sako’s political hit man. After a trip to South Africa last year, Ayim returned and made up a story that Milan Atam had met Issa Tchiroma, he was rewarded with the position of Chief of Staff. After a personal attack on Chris Anu last week, his boss was so impressed with his skills and rewarded him with Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

For failing to raise $100,000 in Berlin for Sako , Dr Elad has been sacked and given an insignificant role in the cabinet. Sako and Chris Anu are strange bed fellows but Chris will carry on as Secretary of Communication. The esteemed Barrister Ndeh has been demoted for failing to find legal grounds to make Sako the Ambazonian Head of State.

Acting Interim President Sako has also appointed members into the Ethics Commission including a General Manager of the Ambazonia National TV station, ABC.  Sako’s new cabinet has more than six Pastors with congregations in several basements in the USA.

Chairman Kometa and the Restoration Council have an easy decision to make. They can be accomplices in this madness or attack the problem. They can stand up for the constitution and institutions of Ambazonia or participate in ripping them apart. One thing is for sure, the people of Ambazonia will hold them collectively accountable. They have to know that the Nuclear Option of an alternative Government is now inevitable and imminent if they fail in their constitutional responsibilities.

By Haggai Fung Achuo

Cameroon Concord News Group

Authorities in Cameroon are jailing opposition politicians and barring their supporters from holding rallies. Security forces and separatist groups continue to carry out atrocities in the country’s restive Anglophone regions. More and more civilians are being forced from their homes, adding to a tally of displaced people that already exceeds half a million.

These problems and more were cited in a speech delivered last week to the European Parliament by Federica Mogherini, the European Union’s top foreign policy official. Her words painted a picture of an increasingly volatile country, just six months after 86-year-old President Paul Biya coasted to reelection following a campaign in which he pitched himself as the only conceivable guarantor of stability.

Brussels isn’t alone in sounding the alarm. African and Western diplomats and human rights groups, to say nothing of observers within Cameroon, have become more vocal in denouncing conditions under Biya, who appears to have interpreted his reelection as an invitation to become even more aggressive in targeting his opponents.

The external scrutiny is the latest indication of Cameroon’s deteriorating international image, which is perhaps inevitable for a country that’s had the same autocratic leader for more than three decades and is battling multiple insurgencies. Yet it’s unclear, at this stage, whether diplomats are interested merely in signaling concern or if they’ll push for real change.

Moreover, there’s no guarantee that, with a leader as entrenched as Biya, the latter is even possible. Hans De Marie Heungoup, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group, notes in an interview that while Biya once put more effort into guarding Cameroon’s reputation, these days he is playing a kind of political “survival game,” making it more difficult for outsiders to influence his behavior. If critical statements aren’t accompanied by steps that could undermine his security apparatus and patronage networks, Biya might be willing to simply ignore them.

“Nowadays he has prepared himself psychologically to withstand this kind of pressure,” Heungoup says. “If that pressure moves from simple, powerful statements to meaningful concrete action, then I suspect that Biya could step back and try to show a more democratic face.”

Cameroon’s security woes, which fuel many of the human rights violations taking place there, are complex. It’s been more than five years since fighters from Boko Haram, the Nigeria-based extremist group, first infiltrated northern Cameroon, drawing the country into a regional counterterrorism campaign. These days, however, instability stems primarily from the “Anglophone crisis,” which has been on the world’s radar for more than two years now. What began in late 2016 with anti-government protests in regions of western Cameroon dominated by the country’s English-speaking minority has turned into an all-out insurgency, with rebel fighters working toward the establishment of an independent nation called Ambazonia.

The separatist violence has triggered a brutal state crackdown. Human Rights Watch reported in late March that security forces, including the elite Rapid Intervention Battalion, have engaged in a spate of violent activity in the months since Biya’s reelection, shooting and killing civilians, sexually assaulting women and burning and looting homes. Human Rights Watch said security forces had “killed scores of civilians,” while warning that “the number of civilian deaths is most likely higher.”

It’s unclear, at this stage, whether diplomats are interested merely in signaling concern or if they’ll push for real change.

Separatists, for their part, have continued their campaign of kidnappings and assault. One witness told Human Rights Watch that two people were beaten to death by separatists on suspicion of having voted in the presidential election, which the separatists considered an illegitimate exercise.

Given the difficulty of reporting in the Anglophone regions, it’s unclear whether the overall level of violence there has increased since the vote. But Heungoup, with the International Crisis Group, says the conflict is expanding into areas that had previously been relatively untouched. And Human Rights Watch noted that violence on the part of the government risked making the situation even worse. “Cameroon’s authorities have an obligation to respond lawfully and to protect people’s rights during periods of violence,” Lewis Mudge, the organization’s Central Africa director, said last month. “The government’s heavy-handed response targeting civilians is counterproductive and risks igniting more violence.”

The political space is similarly troubling. Those looking to mount any kind of challenge to Biya are operating under mounting restrictions. Official results from the October election showed Biya winning reelection with 71 percent of the vote; his closest challenger, Maurice Kamto, officially earned 14 percent. Yet elections in Cameroon are neither free nor fair, and Kamto has insisted that he was the real winner.

In late January, supporters of Kamto’s political party, the Cameroon Renaissance Movement, participated in protests in multiple regions of the country, including its two main cities, Yaounde and Douala. In response, security forces used live ammunition to disperse crowds and arrested hundreds of protesters, according to Amnesty International. The following week, Kamto himself was arrested, and he has remained in custody ever since. His request for provisional release was rejected, a decision that was upheld on appeal earlier this month.

Kamto’s fate seems to be of particular interest to Western officials. In addition to Mogherini, Tibor Nagy, the top U.S. diplomat for African affairs, has raised it publicly, including on a visit last month to Cameroon. This prompted a quick rebuke from a government spokesman. “The Cameroonian government deeply regrets these words which denote a lack of knowledge of the issues, realities and facts,” the spokesman wrote in a press release that accused Nagy of interfering in the government’s internal affairs.

As Emmanuel Freudenthal pointed out in an in-depth report for WPR last year, Washington has recently been more inclined to criticize Cameroon than has France, a former colonial power with deep ties to Biya. Yet Heungoup says that, across the board, there are signs diplomats are recalibrating their approach to Biya’s government.

“They have started to realize the true nature of the regime,” he says. “When I discuss with some diplomats, they are less defensive of Biya. We now see statements at the highest level—statements that we used to not see.”

But will these same diplomats do anything to back up their words? Perhaps Biya’s greatest vulnerability is the security forces. In February, the U.S. announced that it was reducing military aid to the country, citing human rights concerns related to the fight against Boko Haram and Anglophone separatists. “The bottom line is right now in Cameroon, they have been a good partner with us counterterrorism-wise, but you can’t neglect the fact that they have—there are alleged atrocities in what’s gone on there,” Gen. Thomas D. Waldhauser, the head of U.S. Africa Command, said at the time.

Similar measures from the U.S., France and Israel, all of which have been involved in military training and security assistance, could ramp up pressure on Biya. Targeted sanctions could also get the Biya government’s attention, though Washington might want to avoid the kind of standoff they would produce.

In the absence of such steps, it will likely fall to Cameroonians to spur change, perhaps via large-scale protests like those that have threatened the government in the past, most recently in 2008. This would be the messiest kind of upheaval, further giving the lie to the notion that Biya, and only Biya, can keep the country stable.

Reported by World Politics Review

Two years ago, nobody would have thought that the Yaounde crime syndicate that passes off as a government would ever yield to any pressure. The support it was enjoying from France gave it the impression that all would be well at the international level and that Southern Cameroonians would never turn the table on a government that has been built on lies and arrogance.

With French support, the country’s ailing and aging president, Paul Biya, has been conducting himself as a monarch, holding that he was the master of diplomacy and that France will always intercede with the European Union on its behalf.

Of course, for two years, the European Union looked the other way, while Mr. Biya’s militia mowed down the people of the North West and South West regions of the country.

The fighting has gone on for close to three years and more than 5,000 Cameroonians have lost their lives in a war that the U.S.A Undersecretary of State for African Affairs, Tibor Nagy, has declared as unnecessary.

Most of those killed are innocent civilians, especially women and children who cannot run into the bushes for them to be protected by Southern Cameroonian fighters.

Many soldiers have also been sent to an early grave, though their families are not aware of what has happened in the South West jungles where hundreds of soldiers have been buried alive.

The picture is even grimmer when you take a closer look at other aspects of life. Thousands of soldiers are dealing with shattered legs and arms. Post-traumatic stress disorder has become a normal health issue among the country’s soldiers, although the government is doing a good job at hiding the truth.

But the Yaounde government has lost its charm. Its lies have been discovered. First by Americans and later by the European Union that is taking the French government to task for its role in the serious human rights violations that have played out in Cameroon’s two English-speaking regions.

Americans can no longer trust Mr. Biya and his band of incompetent and ineffective gangsters whose cardinal objective is to subject the people of Cameroon to grinding poverty and dehumanizing corruption.

While they consider Cameroon as a major ally in the fight against Boko Haram, the Trump Administration has easily figured out that weapons sent to fight this religious sect were instead used to maim and kill innocent Southern Cameroonians who just want the errors of the past to be addressed through peaceful means.

Washington has promptly reduced its military aid to Mr. Biya’s crime syndicate and has urged its undersecretary of State for African Affairs to speak up against a corrupt and unreliable Yaounde government that has little or nothing to offer its suffering masses.

The Trump Administration wants a political and personality change in Yaounde and Mr. Tibor Nagy has been throwing deadly punches at the old Yaounde government that is visibly on its last leg. The Southern Cameroons charm diplomatic offensive is effective. It is working like a charm.

The European Union is under its spell and there is not much France can do. France’s traditional allies have jumped ship and they are siding with Washington that is clear about its intention.

Thanks to Ambazonian diplomacy, the Trump Administration has woven a network that is hemming in the Yaounde government that once thought it had the leeway to murder its own people with impunity.

The American arms embargo is being supported by most European countries and before the end of this week, Yaounde will know what the EU decision and sanctions will be.

The usual recreation is over and Yaoundé’s reaction to the EU’s criticism of its actions in the two English-speaking regions of the country and its imprisonment of Professor Maurice Kamto, the winner of last year’s presidential election, speaks to the frustration that has become the government’s hallmark.

Last night the country’s minister of communication and government spokesperson held a press conference on the unsettling EU criticism. As usual, he reminded the EU that Cameroon was dealing with common criminals and separatists, adding that Cameroon was a sovereign state.

Cameroon is always a sovereign state when it is being taken to task for misconduct, human rights abuses and corruption. But its sovereignty melts when its president heads to the West, cap in hand, to seek financial assistance to the same countries it has been sending reminders about its sovereignty.

By preaching sovereignty to those who have sustained them in power for decades, Mr. Biya and his government are simply shooting themselves in the foot. Cameroon is hurting and the government has clearly lost its way.

From the noise coming out of Yaounde, it is clear that the government is in a tight spot. Ambazonia’s charm offensive abroad is keeping the government awake all night. Besides taking a punch to the liver due to the humiliation abroad, the government is facing a huge financial deficit. It is out of cash. Its Automatic Teller Machines (ATM) are dry or simply broken down.

CDC, PAMOL, Delmonte and other state-owned corporations have crumbled like packs of cards. Southern Cameroonian fighters have succeeded to disrupt government activities in the English-speaking regions and the cash-cows (state-owned corporations) that have fed Yaounde politicians fat over the last five decades are no longer delivering the “milk and honey” that have kept the system going.

The Southern Cameroons crisis that started like a simple protest has finally brought the arrogant Yaounde government to its knees. Its traditional financial allies are gradually walking away from it and the cash flows that fed its ego are gradually and slowly drying up.

Southern Cameroons’ Diaspora has given the Yaounde government a very bad name and even within international financial institutions, the country is being viewed as a dry hole that has nothing to offer.

Most projects in the two English-speaking regions financed by the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the African Development Bank have been put on hold till further notice.

Funding for the ring road is available at the World Bank and the African Development Bank, but the chaos playing out in the two English-speaking regions has made it hard for any disbursements to be made.

Despite assurances from the beleaguered government, development finance institutions are very reluctant to deal with a government that is adept at speaking from both sides of its mouth.

The nightmare is getting worse by the day. Cameroon’s debtors have begun knocking at the door. They want their money back, but Yaounde is in no position to reimburse the hefty loans it had contracted. The dying government is no longer solvent. The international finance world is skeptical about Cameroon’s ability to meet its international financial obligations.

That is why a high-level delegation from China’s EXIM bank which granted a massive loan to Cameroon in the second half of 2018 has shown up in Yaounde to remind the government of its obligations.

China’s EXIM bank wants its money, but Yaounde is speaking a language that is not music to EXIM bank’s ears. The crafty Chinese are asking for a re-negotiation of the repayment terms. Yaounde has already defaulted in February and this is worrying to the Chinese who are not so sure about Mr. Biya’s future.

It should be recalled that China EXIM bank was the only bank that had accepted to extend a loan to the bankrupt government when all other major international financial institutions lost appetite for Cameroon’s debt.

It never rains, but it pours! It is now hard for Mr. Biya to even venture out to ask for more loans. The U.S.A has slammed members of his government with travel bans and Europe is no longer welcoming. Even Switzerland that took care of Mr. Biya’s health is now thinking differently. Cameroon’s Diaspora has become a major threat to Switzerland and Mr. Biya is no longer wanted on the shores of a country he so loves.

The days ahead bear no hope for Cameroon. Mr. Biya has gambled and lost. His decision to fight instead of negotiating with Southern Cameroonians is finally coming back to haunt him. He has lost his allies and now the money that used to make him arrogant is also disappearing.

However, he still has a chance to make it right. Talking to all the stakeholders and renouncing war as a conflict resolution instrument. The world is watching him. If he does not heed calls by the international community to organize an inclusive dialogue, he might be the next dictator to exit the political scene. This will be a painful exit. He just needs to check with Abdelazziz Bouteflika of Algeria and Omar Al-Bechir of Sudan. It is never too late to mend.

By Kingsley Betek in Yaounde and Soter Tarh Agbaw-Ebai in the United Kingdom

Soccer fans in Cameroon were undoubtedly dismayed in January when the Confederation of African Football stripped the country of its hosting the 2019 June-July African Cup finals. The body cited security issues and lack of preparation in transferring the honor to six-time African Cup host Egypt.

But the recent ouster of two long-serving African presidents—Abdelaziz Bouteflika in Algeria and Omar al-Bashir in Sudan—has intensified the focus by Cameroonians on the nearly 37-year reign of their aloof 86-year-old president, Paul Biya. Citing corruption and political marginalization, opposition figures and Anglophone region activists strive to make Biya the third African leader ousted in 2019 as a result of popular protests. So far, Cameroon’s security services have managed to suppress protests that have broken out, but the Cameroonian diaspora in Europe has been effective in generating sustained attention for change.

While only intermittently covered by American media, and with the United Nations and African Union mostly mute, Cameroon is currently engulfed in three separate crises.

First, since 2014, Boko Haram has terrorized Cameroon’s far north region, adjacent to Nigeria’s Borno State (where Boko Haram was founded in the city of Maiduguri) with murders, kidnappings, and destruction of infrastructure. Despite military support, training, and equipment from the United States and others, Boko Haram in Cameroon remains a persistent, serious threat. Tens of thousands are displaced and livelihoods destroyed. With Boko Haram incursions on the rise in 2019, Yaoundé’s brutal security responses are so tainted with credible human rights allegations that the United States in February announced a reduction in its assistance.

Second, peaceful protests against linguistic and political marginalization in Cameroon’s Anglophone regions erupted in 2016. Anglophones account for approximately 20 percent of Cameroon’s population, with the rest considered Francophone (in addition to about 200 local languages). These protests quickly escalated in 2017 into a violent secessionist insurgency and counter-insurgency. Anglophone separatists hoping to create an independent state of “Ambazonia” in the northwest and southwest regions of Cameroon have attacked soldiers and government installations and killed civilians perceived to be government sympathizers. Local and international human rights activists have documented scorched-earth military reprisals and extrajudicial killings. With positions hardening on both sides, the government rebuffed mediation and dialogue facilitation offers by the United Nations and others, demanding that the United Nations Secretary General’s Special Representative for Central Africa Francois Fall, a former foreign minister of Guinea, end his quiet diplomacy in the Anglophone region. During his March 2019 trip to Cameroon in which he encouraged peaceful resolution of the Anglophone crisis, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy was sharply criticized by pro-government sources for “interference.”

In addition to the heavy burdens imposed by the Boko Haram and Anglophone crises, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that Cameroon—with a population of 24 million—hosts nearly 400,000 refugees fleeing violence in neighboring Nigeria and the Central African Republic.

Now, with the Algerian and Sudanese protests leading to the respective militaries’ removal of two long-serving presidents, previously disparate and quiescent opposition against President Paul Biya has mobilized to create Cameroon’s third, and—while not yet violent—potentially most serious crisis. With previous constitutional term limits abolished in 2008, Biya, who has ruled since November 1982 (and who served as prime minister from 1975 until 1982), was sworn in November 2018 for his seventh presidential term. The official election results, disputed by the opposition, gave him 71 percent of the vote, with opposition leader Maurice Kamto in second position, with just over 14 percent.

For years, fatigue and disenchantment with Biya’s rule has simmered below the surface in Cameroon and boiled openly in the Cameroonian diaspora. Complaints and jokes focus on his frequent and lengthy sojourns in Europe, corruption, aloofness, curtailment of civil liberties, lifestyle of his younger wife Chantal, and (given Biya’s age of 86) lack of any transparent succession planning. The lopsided official election results provoked protests in Cameroon and in diaspora communities, with Kamto claiming victory. The January 2019 arrest of Kamto and scores of protestors in the port city of Douala attracted scant notice in the media outside of Cameroon (despite condemnations from Nagy, EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Federica Mogherini, and others) but reinforced the opposition protests, especially in Europe. Expats attacked Cameroon’s embassies in Paris and Berlin and threatened to storm Geneva’s Intercontinental Hotel, should Biya, a frequent resident, again check in.

Now, with the removals of Bouteflika and Bashir, anti-Biya protesters hope to attract attention with new chants: “It can happen in Sudan; it can happen in Cameroon.” So far, Cameroon’s security services have managed to prevent sustained, mass demonstrations at home. As was the case in Algeria and Sudan while the protest movements swelled, it is not clear how the military would react should the Cameroon opposition movement gain momentum. The military’s performance in the Anglophone and Boko Haram violence is not encouraging, in terms of adherence to human rights norms. But fighting Boko Haram terrorists and Anglophone secessionists simultaneously may give Cameroon’s military leaders pause before taking on, in addition, political protestors in Cameroon’s Francophone political heartland, should Sudan-style mass protests materialize. Biya himself is taking no chances: Unusually for him, he has remained in Cameroon for more than 200 days without travel to Europe.

What is clear is that this is the time for conflict prevention efforts by African or other leaders, in hopes of moderating any response to protests in order to stave off the potential for a third Cameroon crisis turning violent. The problem is identifying a person, institution, or country with influence on Biya, who has been as aloof from his peers as from Cameroon’s citizenry. Despite his frequent and extended absences from Cameroon, he has not used the time abroad to bond with other leaders, rarely attending the annual United Nations General Assembly and only participating in a single African Summit in the last seven years. (Biya attended the March 2013 African Summit in Malabo, probably due to his shared Fang ethnic connection to Equatorial Guinean President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo.) Compared to other heads of state in Francophone Africa, Biya is not especially close to Paris. Given Biya’s de facto part-time residency in Switzerland, and in light of the Cameroonian diaspora’s focus on Geneva, the Swiss may have both interests and leverage, especially if backed by others such as Nagy’s, Mogherini’s, and African Union interventions.

Yet as failed conflict prevention efforts globally demonstrate, persuading any national leader to accept outside help to address a domestic political issue is hard. Biya’s response to U.N., U.S., and other efforts to focus on peaceful resolution of the Anglophone conflict is not encouraging. Regional and international unity to demand a political approach to address Anglophone grievances and expand political space (including release of opposition activists, including Kamto) might force Biya to adjust his approach but will require leadership by the United States or another power to muster. Credit agencies have already noticed that all is not well in Yaounde, with Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s both recently indicating a “negative outlook” to their respective B and B2 credit ratings.       

Cameroon’s immediate neighbors are themselves facing challenges and are not in positions to offer much in the way of help or example. To Cameroon’s northwest, parts of Nigeria remain terrorized by Boko Haram. To Cameroon’s east, the Central African Republic remains deeply unstable and violent, despite the February agreement signed in Khartoum by 14 militias. South of Cameroon, Gabonese President Ali Bongo Ondimba claimed victory in a disputed 2016 election (extending his family’s nearly half-century control over Gabon) but has since October 2018 been absent from Libreville for long stretches of time for health issues. On Cameroon’s southeastern border, the Republic of Congo under President Denis Sasso-Nguesso (no stranger to controversial lopsided election results) has used violence against demonstrators in the Pool region, leading to tens of thousands of displaced, in addition to hosting thousands of refugees fleeing violence in the neighborhood Democratic Republic of Congo. This part of Africa has no shortage of crises, but little in the way of obvious solutions. 

Culled from The Brookings Institution