Journalist Ernest Obama pushed for a complete extermination of every living creature who goes by the appellation Anglophone or Southern Cameroonian. He opined that British Southern Cameroonians fled the civil war in Nigeria and were given political asylum in French Cameroun territory by the regime of Prime Minister Andre Marie Mbida. He saluted the humiliating decision by a French Cameroun court against the renowned veteran journalist Peter Esoka and observed that the Bamilekes had a home somewhere else and not in La Republique du Cameroun. Today, from his detention cell at the State Secretariat for Defense popularly known as SED, Ernest Obama is claiming that Cameroon’s security forces are arresting him because he is not in support of Biya’s continued stay in power.

Dieudonné Ernest Obama Nana (to use his four names) the former CEO of the private television channel VISION 4 has been the “shu shu” of French Cameroun billionaire business tycoon Jean Pierre Amougou Belinga with strong ties to President Biya, Paul Atanga Nji Minister of Territorial Administration, Laurent Esso, Minister of Justice and Keeper of the Seal and the controversial Minister Issa Tchiroma Bakary. His televised arrest in Yaoundé has made public the dispute within the Biya family, which has ruled Cameroon for more than 40 years.

Jean Pierre Amougou Belinga owns a business empire in Cameroon, Gabon, Central Africa Republic, Equatorial Guinea and Chad ranging from telecoms to cocoa and coffee, oil and gas trading that no one in Yaoundé and Douala including top officials in the Cameroon secret service cannot explain how it all started! People in the know only say he and Minister Atanga Nji have questions to answer in the CAMPOST Affair. (See Special Criminal Court documents).

Jean Pierre Amougou Belinga is said to be playing a big role in financing President Biya’s war against the people of Southern Cameroons and making sure that the Bamileke LAAKAM mafia do not get hold of the Cameroonian presidency.  Correspondingly, he and his right hand man, journalist Ernest Obama previously viewed as part of the Biya Francophone Beti Ewondo project have now broken ranks.

It follows reports Ernest Obama, considered French Cameroun’s best Mister News and former boss of Vision 4 is being prosecuted by Jean Pierre Amougou Belinga, the business tycoon and owner of the television station, for breach of trust, high treason and embezzlement of company funds.

By some strange happenstance, Vision 4 aired spectacular images of Mister Obama’s arrest and a report detailing the reasons for the judicial action. Ernest Obama is now getting his own share of the drug he gave to the thousands of innocent Southern Cameroonians killed by French Cameroun army soldiers and of course, he will welcome a visit from the Chairman of the National Communication Council, Mr Peter Esoka anytime soon.

His arrest began in an unacceptable way and the Fren ch Cameroun security forces including his former colleagues who filmed the whole scenario also acted in an inhumane pattern.

Did anyone expect French Cameroun security forces would pounce on Mister Ernest Obama who is their biggest supporter and their propaganda mouth piece ever since the beginning of the Southern Cameroons war?

Mr Jean Pierre Amougou Belinga’s action against Mr Ernest Obama is said to have possibly been ordered by Etoudi, who have propped up the Amougou Belinga business empire, while others have said it is the result of a dispute with Mr Amougou Belinga, over who decides who to succeed President Biya.

By Soter Tarh Agbaw-Ebai

Maurice Kamto is the leader of the Cameroon Renaissance Movement (MRC) and was the main challenger in Cameroon’s 2018 presidential election. He was imprisoned by the government from January to October in 2019.

Nearly one year ago, on August 2, 2019, journalist Samuel Ajiekah Abuwe—better known as Wazizi—was arrested and detained by government forces in Buea, located in the South-West region of Cameroon. Since 2017, Buea has been home to unrelenting violence between the government and separatist fighters. For three hundred days after his arrest, despite numerous domestic and international calls to produce Wazizi, authorities in Cameroon remained silent about his fate. This detention was indeed a textbook case of enforced disappearance. Despite holding out bleak hopes that Wazizi might eventually emerge alive, our worst fears came true when we learned he had died in custody following torture.

Like many other critics in Cameroon—including additional journalists—Wazizi was accused of “collaborating with separatists,” though his lawyers claim he had not been charged with any offense prior to his disappearance. I personally experienced this treatment. In early 2019, I was charged by a military court with rebellion and “hostility to the homeland” after my political party—the Cameroon Renaissance Movement (CRM)—staged peaceful protests in major cities, following a rigged presidential election in October 2018. Since that time, I have been repeatedly intimidated by the government and its associated militia groups, often being threatened with arrest and death.

Luckily, I am alive today and can raise my voice, while Wazizi can no longer. His commitment to basic freedoms, and his legacy, will surely live on. Importantly as well, his death at the hands of Cameroonian authorities raises major questions about the future of our country. Just last week—for the second year in a row—Cameroon topped the Norwegian Refugee Council’s list of “most neglected crises” worldwide. Our country is hemorrhaging under the boots of a dictatorship. More than ever, we need international assistance.

Indeed, for Cameroon to meet the long-subdued aspirations of its people, we must implement a democratic agenda—a viable path forward. The situation demands leadership and it is evident that the current ruling regime is unwilling to exercise the necessary courage.

First and foremost, all political prisoners incarcerated in Cameroon must be released—this would include Ayuk Tabe, the Anglophone separatist leader, and Mamadou Yakuba, our first Vice-President at the CRM. Secondly, to ensure that Wazizi’s death is not in vain, the government and key political and civic actors, should agree to a consensual political roadmap that principally includes an overhaul of the electoral system to end the ongoing post-electoral crisis.

Lastly, we must agree to definitively end our country’s ongoing civil war in the Anglophone regions. Too often over the years, the government has used conflict to justify the incarceration of journalists like Wazizi and opposition leaders like myself and my colleagues. This is why the international community must organize an all-inclusive dialogue with Cameroonian leaders across the political spectrum. This initiative would ideally fall under the auspices of the United Nations and cooperate directly with African Union leadership and Cameroon’s development partners.

For now, it is not yet too late to act. But act we must.

Culled from Council on Foreign Relations

Civilians in Cameroon’s Anglophone Northwest and Southwest regions are at immediate risk of mass atrocities in a political crisis that emerged from the government’s real and perceived marginalization of Anglophone linguistic and cultural rights and identity.

Cameroon currently ranks number nine of countries at risk of mass killing in the Simon-Skjodt Center’s Statistical Risk Assessment. The situation has deteriorated significantly since 2017, when Cameroon ranked 36th. After Anglophone civilians launched protests in late 2016 alleging marginalization by the Francophone-majority government, state security forces responded violently, allegedly arresting, beating, and shooting demonstrators. Clashes ensued, with security forces reportedly killing over 20 people in a 12-day period in largely peaceful protests in September and October 2017. Shortly after, Anglophone separatists began fighting for independence for the territory they referred to as Southern Cameroons or Ambazonia.

The crisis emerged from the long-standing political grievances of the Anglophone community. Yet today, fighting between the two sides makes it difficult to discern motives. Security forces are reportedly targeting Anglophone civilians accused of supporting separatists. It is unclear to what extent security forces are also targeting the Anglophone linguistic and cultural identity. Meanwhile, armed separatists claiming to represent the Anglophone population are reportedly targeting civilians they perceive as supporting the government.

Since 2017, the crisis has resulted in:

• More than 3,000 Cameroonians killed.
• Approximately 700,000 internally displaced people and nearly 60,000 refugees in neighboring Nigeria.
• Nearly two million Cameroonians in need of humanitarian assistance, a 15-fold increase since 2017.
• Targeting of civilians by state security forces and Anglophone armed separatist groups.

With the government set on a military victory and armed separatists set on independence, there are no readily apparent pathways to a peaceful, negotiated resolution of the crisis. As long as this situation persists, civilians are at immediate risk of mass atrocities.

This policy brief provides an overview of the risks of mass atrocities in Cameroon’s Anglophone regions and provides recommendations to the Cameroonian government, armed separatist groups, and international actors to prevent atrocities and protect civilians.

BACKGROUND

The crisis in Cameroon’s Northwest and Southwest regions emerged from decades of lingering grievances of Anglophone citizens, who make up 20 percent of the population in a mostly Francophone country. After World War I, the colonial powers of France and the United Kingdom administered the former German colony of Kamerun as mandate territories and then as joint trustees, leading to the development of politically and culturally distinct Francophone and Anglophone regions. The French territory gained independence in 1960. Meanwhile, the United Nations (UN) gave the British territory of Northern Cameroons and Southern Cameroons no option for independence in a 1961 referendum. Northern Cameroons joined Nigeria while Southern Cameroons joined the Republic of Cameroon, which became the Federal Republic of Cameroon.

Anglophones were promised a degree of autonomy under the new federal system. Instead, the Francophone government abolished federalism just a decade later and changed the name of the country to the United Republic of Cameroon. It instituted policies that economically and politically marginalized the Anglophone regions over the next four decades.

In October 2016, Anglophone teachers and lawyers launched protests over the imposition of French-speaking teachers in Anglophone schools and the “francization” of the Anglophone common law system. In November, security forces reportedly responded to the growing protests with violence, which fed Anglophone nationalism and prompted clashes between the two sides. Initially the government attempted to negotiate with the lawyers and teachers, but by January 2017, the government-sponsored negotiations broke down and leaders of Anglophone associations were arrested. On October 1 of that year an increasingly militant separatist movement declared an independent Anglophone “Ambazonia.” Violent conflict between armed separatists and state security forces, as well as pro-government militias, intensified and continues to date.(i)

ATROCITIES & HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Experts have asserted that attacks by security forces and separatists may rise to the level of crimes against humanity.(ii) In violation of their duty to protect civilians, Cameroonian security forces are waging a targeted campaign against civilians they perceive to support separatists. Security forces have been accused of arbitrarily arresting, detaining, and torturing civilians; firing indiscriminately into crowds; forcibly entering homes and killing inhabitants; and rounding up and shooting villagers. Security forces’ “scorched earth” tactic of burning and razing villages suspected of harboring separatists has resulted in more than 200 villages allegedly raided or partially destroyed. Sexual violence is reported to be widespread. According to civilian witnesses, attacks on civilians are frequently retaliation for the actions of armed separatists. Some experts say this could be part of a strategy to bring the crisis to an end by exhausting the civilian population so they stop supporting separatists. In one of the deadliest massacres of the crisis, security forces and allied Fulani militia reportedly killed nearly two dozen people, including at least 13 children, suspected of harboring separatists in Ngarbuh village in Northwest Cameroon in February 2020.(iii)

Meanwhile, armed separatists have been accused of attacking and killing civilians they perceive to be associated with or sympathetic to the government. Separatists have allegedly brutally attacked, shot, harassed, and kidnapped students, teachers, and administrators on their way to school to enforce a school boycott in the Anglophone regions. The school boycott, which some experts allege is an attempt to make the region ungovernable and thereby garner political recognition, is now in its third year, although some schools reportedly have opened in the regional capital cities of Bamenda and Buea. As a result of the school shutdown, more than 855,000 children have been out of school since 2017 according to the UN Children’s Fund. Separatists have also been accused of torture, arson, kidnapping, and abducting and attacking traditional chiefs accused of supporting the government. They have targeted government-owned and local businesses, burned schools, and transformed classrooms into armed bases.

On numerous occasions, the government has reportedly imposed internet shutdowns, threatened journalists, and restricted access for independent researchers in an effort to dispel attention to the crisis. These measures, in addition to threats posed by armed separatists, have resulted in the underreporting of attacks and uncertainty around the scale of the crisis.

RESPONSE

Both the government and separatists deny many of the reported violations, and neither side appears willing to make meaningful concessions that could lead to genuine dialogue. In September 2019, Cameroonian President Paul Biya launched a five-day national dialogue focused on the Anglophone crisis. Separatist leaders refused to attend because the Cameroonian government ignored their conditions for participating, including mediation in an external location and consideration of the terms of a separation. The dialogue resulted in a series of recommendations and the release of hundreds of activists, including prominent opposition leader Maurice Kamto, but failed to solve the Anglophone crisis. In December 2019, the government adopted legislation for a special status for the Anglophone regions, as part of an Omnibus Decentralization Law. Special status has been rejected by separatists and other Anglophone groups who claim that it falls short of even federalist demands. Mediation efforts led by Switzerland that began in June 2019 have produced limited results. Following intense international pressure, the Cameroonian government released a report in April 2020 which admitted that soldiers were responsible for civilian deaths in the Ngarbuh massacre, an important step in accountability but one that does not replace inclusive efforts to resolve the crisis.

Since 2019, the U.S. government has responded to the situation in Cameroon by taking a number of important steps, including: withholding military aid; reducing security assistance;(iv) ending trade preference for the country under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA); and calling for an independent investigation into the massacre in Ngarbuh village. A U.S. Congressional delegation visited Cameroon in July 2019, and members of Congress supported a resolution calling for dialogue and an end to violence, which was passed in the House and introduced in the Senate.

The U.S. has taken helpful measures to ensure consequences for the government’s targeting of civilians, but these initial actions cannot replace regional or multilateral initiatives and pressure to bring both parties to an inclusive process of dialogue and resolution. The absence of sustained and priority-level engagement of the UN, the African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) lessens the positive impact of one-off actions of individual nations. Cameroon is not on the official agenda of the UN Security Council, and with the exception of a May 2019 Arria Formula meeting on the humanitarian situation, the Security Council has paid minimal attention. In February 2020, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights called for an independent investigation into the Ngarbuh massacre, as did the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. The AU has remained relatively quiet, but has lent support to the Swiss mediation efforts. The AU also joined the Commonwealth and the International Organisation of la Francophonie in a tripartite mission to Cameroon to reduce violence, however the mission did not visit any Anglophone towns or cities where the crisis persists.

RISKS OF FUTURE MASS ATROCITIES

Since the end of 2019, Cameroon’s Anglophone crisis has seemingly entered a new phase of increased attacks on civilians. The longer the crisis persists, the more civilians will be harmed. The current greatest risk facing civilians is that the crisis becomes more protracted as both sides refuse to seek a political solution and the capacity of separatist groups to commit violence increases. The death of President Biya in office could also produce instability that could escalate the crisis.

The following developments fuel the risk of mass atrocities:

1. Abuses by security forces and separatists are on the rise.

In the months leading up to the February 2020 legislative and local elections, separatists and security forces launched an unprecedented barrage of attacks on civilians. Separatists attacked candidates and voters who participated in what they called “sham” elections. Security forces, instead of protecting voters, burned several villages and committed dozens of killings, including the Ngarbuh massacre. It is uncertain how the COVID-19 pandemic will affect this rise in violence. It is possible that COVID-19 may divert attention away from the Anglophone crisis, allowing attacks on civilians to proliferate unchecked.

2. The separatist movement is fracturing.

There is no united separatist movement, but rather an increasingly disorganized collection of distinct groups, some of which are clashing. Some separatist groups are reportedly becoming increasingly brutal in their attacks on civilians. Security forces use this as justification to conduct more violent attacks on separatist groups and civilians accused of hosting or housing them in their communities. It is unclear the degree of control that separatist leaders in the diaspora have over armed groups on the ground.

3. Separatist groups are becoming better equipped and trained.

To replace the improvised or locally-produced hunting shotguns used at the beginning of the crisis, separatists are reportedly capturing more sophisticated weapons from Cameroonian security forces, in addition to smuggling weapons in from Nigeria. There have been recent reports of separatists producing homemade bombs and improvised explosive devices. Separatist groups may also be setting up training camps in Nigeria, according to some experts. Up to this point, external actors have been unwilling to fund a fragmented separatist movement, though some diaspora have allegedly crowdsourced funds for weapons for separatists. If groups become significantly better equipped, trained, and funded, their attacks might become more strategic and inflict greater damage on both civilians and security forces. This could lead security forces to double down and increase attacks on separatists and civilians. Additionally, there are some allegations that separatists have recently conducted attacks outside the Anglophone regions. If the allegations of separatist involvement in these attacks are proven, this would signal that separatists are capable of projecting force outside the Anglophone regions, which could cause violence to spread and escalate, putting more civilians (including internally displaced Anglophones in neighboring Francophone regions) at risk.

4. Security forces are becoming emboldened by a sense of impunity and more brazen in their attacks on civilians.

As the crisis persists and security forces are not held accountable, they are pursuing increasingly brutal attacks on civilians, including reportedly attacking former safe havens, such as hospitals, health facilities, and palaces of traditional leaders. As some separatist groups become more violent, security forces have more freedom to act with impunity.

5. Neither side appears willing to make the concessions necessary for a political solution.

Anglophone Cameroonians are increasingly leaning toward a common call for independence. Largely because of the government’s half-hearted response to Anglophone grievances, many Anglophones who were willing to discuss federalism early in the crisis now do not see a solution besides independence. Meanwhile, the Cameroonian government is determined to obtain a military victory over the separatists. At the end of 2019, President Biya reiterated his commitment to using military force against separatists, despite widespread international acknowledgment that the crisis requires a political solution. The government refuses to make meaningful concessions on key Anglophone grievances, including political autonomy and recognition of historical and structural inequities. Faced with increasingly sophisticated armed separatist groups, pursuing a military solution will only prolong the crisis.

6. The sudden death or departure from office of the aging president may leave a power vacuum that could further destabilize the Anglophone regions.

Despite his fragile health, President Biya, 87, has maintained a tight grip on power since 1982. He has failed to groom a successor for a peaceful political transition. An abrupt end to his rule could prompt a chaotic and possibly violent power scramble, which could further destabilize the Anglophone crisis. Separatists would likely take advantage of a power vacuum to wage further attacks, and the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR), Cameroon’s elite security force which is allegedly loyal to Biya, could escalate its attacks on civilians without restraint. On the other hand, a shift in power could also bring fresh thinking and greater impetus for a negotiated resolution to the crisis.

7. Public events are potential triggers.

Narratives around holidays and public events like elections – including the idea that there can be national holidays or “free and fair” elections in the midst of the Anglophone crisis – have historically provoked outrage among separatists and led them to impose lockdowns. These lockdowns are often a pretext for further violence against civilians, as was the case in lead-up to the February 2020 elections. Though most public events, including Cameroon’s National Day on May 20, have been cancelled because of the COVID-19 pandemic, future public events could trigger such violence in the absence of efforts from the Cameroonian government toward an inclusive dialogue.

POLICY OPTIONS

Anglophone grievances are longstanding and deep-seated. Solving the crisis requires a good faith commitment by the state to directly address substantive grievances and a willingness by separatists to come to the table.

For the government of Cameroon

• Cease the targeting of civilians by state security forces.
• Embrace a credible mediation process that includes the voices of armed groups, civil society, and affected Anglophone communities.
• End discriminatory practices against Anglophones and include Anglophone leaders and affected communities in discussions about fostering proper representation across the regions’ schools, courts, and other civilian infrastructure.
• Launch a credible investigation into all abuses, supported by the AU and/or UN. This could include a truly independent office to investigate all atrocities. Ensure that perpetrators on both the government and separatist sides are held accountable according to international legal standards.
• Improve access to the Anglophone regions for humanitarian organizations.

For Anglophone armed separatist groups and their civilian leaders

• Cease the targeting of civilians and, should the government declare a ceasefire, respond to such ceasefire by stopping all hostilities against state institutions and individuals associated with them.
• End the years-long shutdown of schools in Anglophone regions.
• Participate in a credible mediation process that includes representatives of civil society and affected Anglophone communities.
• Cooperate with any future international investigative mechanisms tasked with gathering information from the Anglophone areas.

For foreign governments

• Undertake an assessment of atrocity risks and implement prevention and mitigation strategies, including the following:
• Support and encourage the government and separatists to welcome external assistance in a credible mediation process.
• Ensure no military assistance is directly or indirectly supporting the violence being perpetrated against civilians. Link security assistance to demonstrable progress by the Cameroonian government on protecting civilians, investigating human rights violations, and promoting accountability for such crimes.
• Through the UN Security Council, General Assembly, Human Rights Council, or Secretary General, establish a formal investigation into the commission of atrocities in Cameroon.
• Call for a Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Cameroon through the UN or the AU.
• Consider targeted sanctions against members of security forces and separatist leaders, including in the diaspora, who are committing, aiding, or abetting attacks on civilians.

For the African Union

• The AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) should add Cameroon to its agenda and use the array of prevention tools available, including but not limited to activating the Panel of the Wise on the Anglophone crisis.
• The AUPSC should request monthly updates on the crisis from their Continental Early Warning System and adopt appropriate actions in response to the early warnings received.
• Appoint a Special Envoy to facilitate dialogue between the Cameroonian government and separatist groups. Ensure civil society and affected communities are represented.
• If the government fails to immediately launch a credible and comprehensive investigation into the atrocities and crimes, initiate an AU Commission of Inquiry.
• Pursue the Cameroon crisis under point two of the AU’s Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020, which is “consideration of cases of denials of early warning signs on looming crises.”

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Boko Haram in the Far North

As media, political, and military attention is increasingly focused on the Anglophone crisis, civilians in the Far North region fear being abandoned. Since at least 2014, they have been targeted by Boko Haram. The government declared war in 2014. The crisis has seen 2,000 civilians killed and nearly 300,000 Cameroonians displaced.

The tactics of the government have led to some reduction in the threat posed by Boko Haram, but this has come at a cost. Government forces are reported to have committed widespread human rights violations, including arbitrary killings, torture, and arrests. All civilians in Cameroon must be protected from the risk of atrocities.

COVID-19 in Cameroon

As of this writing, Cameroon has the highest COVID-19 caseload in Central Africa. Civilians in conflict-affected regions, particularly the nearly 700,000 civilians who are internally displaced as a result of the Anglophone crisis, are at disproportionate risk of contracting the virus. Thirty-four percent of the health facilities in the Anglophone regions are non-functional or only partially functional as a result of the Anglophone crisis, and attacks on healthcare workers by security forces and armed separatists have reduced their presence. Lockdowns, roadblocks, and checkpoints maintained by separatists and security forces will likely block humanitarian aid.

It is unclear how the COVID-19 pandemic will impact the dynamics of the Anglophone crisis. In March 2020, one separatist group declared a ceasefire in response to the pandemic, but neither the Cameroonian government nor other separatist groups have followed suit. Attacks on civilians by both security forces and armed separatists are reportedly ongoing. Due to the distraction of COVID-19 and the inaccessibility of the Anglophone regions to international monitors and journalists, attacks on civilians, which are currently on the rise, could be covered up or under reported. Security forces and armed separatist groups should respond to the COVID-19 pandemic by ending attacks on civilians and pursuing a peaceful, negotiated resolution to the Anglophone crisis.

Culled from United States Holocaust Memorial Museum

Edith Kahbang Walla’s presidential ambitions began with a confrontation. It was 2010, and the opposition Social Democratic Front (SDF) was planning to field its longtime chairperson for the third time in the following year’s election against President Paul Biya. Walla challenged her party leader to a primary. When he refused, she quit.

A decade later, the 55-year-old management consultant — better known as Kah Walla — is a leading face of the Cameroonian opposition. The rare woman in the country’s top political echelons, the president of the Cameroon People’s Party (CPP) has faced arrests, death threats and beatings. But that has only strengthened her resolve to end Biya’s four-decade dictatorship. Only Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Mbasogo has been president longer.

As the coronavirus outbreak hit Cameroon, Walla wrote an open letter to Biya, who rarely addresses the country, asking him to publicly reassure citizens. When the octogenarian finally appeared in public in mid-April, it was only for a meeting with the French ambassador.

Walla is trying to fill that leadership void. Ahead of Ramadan, which started on April 23, she visited mosques to spread awareness on social distancing and to distribute masks. Her campaign is distributing masks to women in different parts of Douala too.

At the same time, Walla is playing the long game. To defeat Biya, she knows that Cameroon’s institutions need to change first.

After polling sixth out of 23 candidates in 2011, when she contested for the CPP, Walla was expected to build on that momentum in the 2018 elections. Instead, her party boycotted the vote, accusing the electoral commission of partisanship. Walla wasn’t going to legitimize what she says was a staged exercise. The CPP also boycotted the 2020 parliamentary elections, insisting on reforms of the political institutions and electoral process, rather than holding local elections.

“There has not been anything that even vaguely resembles a free and fair election in Cameroon in all of our history,” Walla says. “The ruling party has made the admin [electoral commission] a branch of the party.”

Indeed, when Biya won a seventh term by a landslide amid allegations of widespread fraud in 2018, it was not news. President since 1982, he had been prime minister for seven years prior. Biya’s former justice minister, Maurice Kamto, who contested as the opposition coalition candidate in 2018, was detained for nine months at the Kondengui maximum-security prison in Yaoundé, the Cameroonian capital.

Still, it appears that Walla worries Biya.

The house where she lives in the commercial capital of Douala with her partner and their seven adopted children was surrounded by police trucks on the eve of the 2018 election results to prevent her from attending a peaceful protest.

All of that has failed to deter Walla, whose life so far has been a lesson in commitment to Pan-Africanism and civil liberties. As a nurse training at the University College Hospital in Ibadan, Nigeria — West Africa’s first medical college — Walla’s mother had promised her colleagues she would return there to give birth to her first child. In February 1965, she flew there to keep her commitment. As a child in a newly independent Cameroon, Walla would often accompany her mother to radio stations and listen to her speak about women’s rights on-air.

Walla’s civil servant parents were averse to partisan politics, and at home, Walla’s education focused on loyalty to nationhood and the rule of law rather than to government. “I grew up in an environment where it was very important to stand up for your rights and contribute to your community,” she says.

Those lessons in bridge building are central to Walla’s efforts to challenge Biya by uniting a divided nation. The next presidential elections are five years away, but she’s already preparing. The CPP organizes what it calls Black Friday campaigns during which attendees all wear black headgear, showing solidarity with political prisoners and the country’s Anglophone region, which has been fighting discrimination for decades. The key message, Walla says, is that the CPP is fighting an enemy common to all Cameroonians: Biya’s regime.

Challenging the dictatorship has costs. Walla has been kidnapped by the presidential guard, hosed during a protest, brutalized by security officials and arrested multiple times. It’s all far removed from the path she was charting when, after studying in Cameroon and the Ivory Coast, she went to the United States to earn two degrees, including an MBA from Howard University School of Business.

But after years of campaigning for political change from the sidelines, Walla took the plunge, joining the SDF in 2007 and winning elections to the Douala City Council that year. “She did what leaders must do: She raised her voice to be heard,” says Anne Doyle, a councilwoman in Auburn Hills, Michigan, who met Walla at a global women’s leadership conference in 2008.

Walla did that again, when she challenged the SDF leader. “He was shocked,” she says, laughing. But Walla was confident, says Ateki Caxton, the Yaoundé-based executive director of pro-democracy network NewSETA. She was seen as someone “not afraid to confront some of the very patriarchal orientations of the party,” Caxton says.

Patriarchy remains a challenge for Walla. “A lot of young people admire her party, but people still feel it’s not yet time to have a female president,” says Caxton.

And despite her support for greater Anglophone rights, Walla has received death threats from groups fighting for a breakaway republic of Ambazonia, comprising the country’s two Anglophone regions.

It is “unconscionable to opt for a fight that inflicts further violence” on people, Walla says. “I am very much for the cause, but I do not believe in secession, because as an African, I don’t believe that my identity begins with who colonized me, so I cannot see myself defining my future on the basis of being Anglophone or Francophone.”

So far, there’s little evidence that Biya’s grip over Cameroon is loosening. Still, Caxton believes Walla could be a “key actor in the post-Biya era,” whenever that may be. “She’s one of those people trying to break the glass ceiling, and in Cameroon, that glass ceiling is made of marble.” Walla has shown the patience and persistence to chip away until it’s her time.

Culled from Ozy.com

As Cameroon eases coronavirus restrictions, the government is accused of politicising the pandemic.

Government leaders in Cameroon have been accused of being more interested in fighting the opposition than COVID-19.

Despite accusations of putting the population in harm’s way, the government has reopened airports and schools.

Cameroon has one of Africa’s highest infection rates with more than 200 people reported dead and 6,000 cases.

Written by aljazeera